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Mobile devices like smartphones and tablets are being adopted with
unprecedented speed. The growth in demand and system complexity increas-
ingly requires collaboration of multiple parties in order to achieve better func-
tionality, efficiency, performance, etc. This poses unique challenges such as
information sharing among different parties, utility sharing among different
parties, and dishonest and collusive behaviors.
Different mobile services may require different types of collaboration
and involve different entities in the system. In this work we take a bottom-
up approach by first looking at collaboration at the end user level, then the
cross level collaboration and finally at the service provider level. Specifically,
we first consider a completely distributed service: friend discovery in mobile
social networks, where users of a mobile social network work together with
each other to discover potential new friends nearby by computing their social
proximity. We develop mathematically sound yet highly efficient approaches
iv
that simultaneously achieve privacy and verifiability. We then focus on cellu-
lar oﬄoading where a cellular service provider seeks third party resource to
oﬄoad cellular demand, as an example of cross level collaboration. We pro-
pose a reverse auction framework: iDEAL, which efficiently allocates cellular
resource and third party resource in a joint optimization, effectively incentivize
third party resource owners and mitigates dishonest and collusive behaviors.
We validate our findings and approaches with real trace driven analysis and
simulation, as well as real implementation. Finally we focus on collaboration
at the service provider level and propose a double auction framework - DA2.
DA2 allows cellular service providers to reallocate spectrum resource in a dy-
namic fashsion. It preserves all the desired economic properties. Compared
with existing spectrum double auctions, DA2 achieves higher efficiency, rev-
enue, and spectrum resource utilization, due to its ability to more accurately
capture the competition among buyers, which is characterized by a complex
conflict graph. We evaluate DA2 and demonstrate its superior performance
via simulations on conflict graphs generated with real cell tower locations.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Motivation: As the world embrace new generation of mobile devices such as
smartphones and tablets, many different mobile services start to emerge and
become part of people’s everyday lives. As the demand and system complexity
keeps growing, it’s becoming increasingly important that many services needs
collaboration of multiple parties in order to ensure usability, achieve high effi-
ciency and performance. For such collaboration to be effective, several unique
challenges need to be addressed:
• Information sharing among different parties. Information sharing is crit-
ical for many collaborations to be effective but is hard to achieve. Most
companies consider information as an important asset and individual
users are also becoming increasingly aware of their privacy. It’s unclear
how to avoid unnecessary information leak and in the meantime facilitate
efective collaboration.
• Utility sharing among different parties. In order to enable certain collab-
oration, each party must be given certain incentives. While incentives
have been well studied in environments such as P2P, the mobile envi-
ronment is very different. Moreover incentive is also service dependent.
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The form of incentive, the amount of incentive, the party that gives the
incentive and the party that receives the incentive can vary a lot when
different services are considered.
• Dishonest and collusive behaviors. When multiple parties are involved,
it’s hard to assume trust between all parties, especially when one party
can lie or a few parties can collude to maximize their utility. It’s critical
to defend against such behaviors such that the collaboration is fair and
sustainable.
There are a wide spectrum of mobile services. Some are closer to the
service provider while others may be closer to end users. Collaboration can
happen within each level or even across levels. To develop general principles
and techniques for enabling collaborative mobile services, in this work we take
a bottom-up approach, where we first consider a mostly distributed service that
only requires collaboration between end users: friend discovery in mobile social
network, and then we study the cross level collaboration between a cellular
service provider and third party resource owners who are able to oﬄoad cellular
traffic, finally we focus on collaboration between cellular service providers by
enabling spectrum resource allocation in a dynamic and flexible fashion.
Friend discovery in mobile social networks: An essential capability of-
fered by mobile social networks is to allow mobile users to discover and interact
with friends who happen to be in their physical vicinity. Suppose you are wait-
ing for your flight in an airport and your mobile phone discovers your friend’s
2
friend is in the next aisle and you can talk with face-to-face. Or you visit a
new place and your mobile phone finds someone in your vicinity shares similar
attributes as you so that you can interact with. Though promising, it creates
serious privacy and security concerns. In particular, people are often reluctant
to reveal their presence and personal profile to an arbitrary person in their
vicinity. It is also unwise to blindly trust information received from an arbi-
trary person. While similar issues also exist in online social networks, these
concerns become more serious because mobile social networks blur the bound-
ary between the cyberspace and the physical world. Moreover, the broadcast
nature of wireless medium also makes it easy for a malicious user to spoof and
inject traffic into the mobile social networks.
This is an important yet challenging problem because it involves joint
computation between two parties that do not trust each other. The stan-
dard approach for predicting friendship is based on the notion of proximity
measure, which quantifies the closeness or similarity between nodes in a social
network. Many proximity measures have been proposed, including the number
of common neighbors, the number of common attributes, cosine similarity, and
path-ensemble-based measures. As shown in Section 2.2, they can all be cast
as a dot product operation on two vectors. Therefore we consider proximity
computation as a dot product operation without loss of generality. To identify
potential friends, two users can exchange their social coordinates and compute
the proximity between them; if their proximity exceeds a threshold, they try
to make friends with each other.
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However, directly exchanging social coordinates and computing their
dot product opens door to a variety of attacks. In particular, we identify
two serious attacks: (i) fingerprinting an individual user (based on either her
social coordinate or her proximity with another known social coordinate), and
(ii) falsifying proximity (e.g., an attacker forges a social coordinate close to
a target user’s social coordinate to trick the user to make friend with the
attacker). Defending against these attacks is particularly challenging because
we want to simultaneously achieve two conflicting goals: ensuring verifiability
(so that a malicious user cannot forge his/her social coordinate or forge the
outcome of proximity computation), yet preserving privacy (i.e., divulge no
private information if the true proximity between two users is below the desired
threshold).
To address the challenge, we develop novel techniques and protocols for
computing proximity in a privacy-preserving, verifiable, and efficient manner.
Specifically, we first develop a proximity pre-filtering protocol for determining
whether the proximity between two users exceeds a given threshold. The
protocol ensures that the initiator can only learn the comparison result between
the estimated proximity and the threshold.
The protocol does not involve any expensive cryptographic computation
and is thus highly efficient. However in this protocol a malicious user can forge
the comparison result. To defend against such attacks, we then develop two
secure dot product protocols: one is based on homomorphic cryptography
and the other leverages both homomorphic cryptography and obfuscation for
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higher efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, they are the first secure dot
product protocols that are both privacy-preserving and verifiable.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocols using both analysis
and real implementation on smartphone.
Incentivize cellular oﬄoading via auctions: The explosive growth of
cellular traffic and its highly dynamic nature make it increasingly expensive for
a cellular service provider to provision enough cellular resources to support all
its consumers at all times. The current best practice is for service providers
to augment the cellular network capacity by deploying alternative wireless
technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi and femtocells) on their own. While this approach
is helpful in alleviating the stress on the busiest cellular regions in the short
term, it alone is not sufficient in the long run due to the high deployment cost
and excessive interference.
A better alternative is to leverage resources on demand from third-party
resource owners by buying capacity whenever needed. On-demand purchase
of such resources can potentially lead to a win-win solution: the cellular ser-
vice provider achieves significant savings by not having to provision for the
peak traffic demands; the third-party resource owners gain additional revenue
from the otherwise wasted spare capacity; the overall user experience is also
improved.
In order for the auction based cellular oﬄoading to be successful, how-
ever, it is essential to have an incentive framework that can effectively fos-
5
ter collaboration while guarding against non-truthful and collusive behavior.
Specifically we identify the following unique challenges, none of which have
been considered earlier.
• Diverse spatial coverage. Cellular resources can serve traffic anywhere in a
cell sector (albeit at different rates depending on path loss etc.), whereas
Wi-Fi hotspots and femtocells have a much more limited communication
range, making it essential to consider the spatial coverage of different re-
sources. However, one cannot simply partition resources into separate re-
gions and launch independent reverse auctions within each region, because
the longer-range cellular resource introduces coupling between the Wi-Fi
hotspots or femtocells in different regions. For example, buying more re-
sources from a cheaper Wi-Fi hotspot in one region frees up more cellular
resources, which reduces the amount of cellular traffic to be oﬄoaded from
regions with more expensive Wi-Fi hotspots.
• Traffic uncertainty. Cellular traffic is highly dynamic and unpredictable.
Since the cellular service provider has to purchase third-party resources
based on predicted traffic demands at a future time, it can easily result in
under-provisioning or over-provisioning without an effective technique to
cope with traffic uncertainties. In contrast, in conventional reverse auction
settings, the total amount of goods that the buyer wants is typically known
a priori.
6
• Non-truthful bidding and collusion. It is essential for us to explicitly guard
against both non-truthful bidding and collusion. Due to the distributed
nature of hotspot locations, collusion in our context is quite different from
what were studied previously and calls for a new study to understand
possible collusion strategies and mitigate them.
To address these challenges we propose iDEAL, a novel auction-based
incentive framework to enable dynamic oﬄoading of cellular traffic. In iDEAL,
a cellular service provider purchases bandwidth on demand from third-party
resource owners through reverse auctions, where a third-party resource owner
may be a Wi-Fi hotspot owner, a femtocell owner, or another cellular ser-
vice provider. In each reverse auction, the goods of interest are bandwidth
resources, the bidders (i.e., sellers or auctionees) are the third-party resource
owners, and the auctioneer is the cellular service provider (or a trusted third
party). Each bidder (i.e., third-party resource owner) submits a bid that spec-
ifies the total amount of bandwidth it offers in the next time interval and the
unit price the bidder asks for. After collecting all the bids, the cellular service
provider determines (i) an allocation, i.e., how to allocate its customer traffic
between different third-party resource owners (depending on the region they
cover) and its own cellular network, and (ii) a price, i.e., how much it pays
each third-party resource owner that oﬄoads cellular traffic.
iDEAL has the following distinctive features: (i) iDEAL explicitly ac-
counts for the spatial coverage of different resources and can effectively foster
competition among third-party resource owners in different regions, resulting
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in significant savings to the cellular service provider. (ii) iDEAL incentivizes
bidders (i.e., third-party resource owners) to participate in the reverse auction
and to be truthful in their bidding. (iii) iDEAL is provably efficient in that
the winners are the bidders who have the lowest valuation of their resources.
(iv) iDEAL can effectively mitigate collusion. (v) iDEAL can effectively cope
with the highly dynamic nature of traffic demands.
We present useful extensions to iDEAL: (i) support general bidding
curves, which gives a hotspot owner the flexibility to submit its ask price in the
form of a curve, such that different unit price is used when different amount
of capacity is sold; (ii) support femtocell oﬄoading and dynamic roaming;
(iii) incorporate quality of service consideration (in addition to cost); (iv)
potentially delay demands that are delay-tolerant to further reduce cost and
improve efficiency, and (v) determine which users’ traffic to oﬄoad.
We extensively evaluate iDEAL using simulation based on real traces
from one of the largest US cellular service providers. Our results clearly demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach. We further demonstrate the feasibility
of our approach using a simple prototype implementation.
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation via Double Auctions: As the world
embraces wireless and mobile technologies at an unprecedented rate, wireless
traffic is growing exponentially. Wireless traffic is also known to fluctuate
heavily over time, following strong diurnal and weekly patterns [96, 72]. This
explosive growth of wireless traffic and its highly dynamic nature can make it
costly for a single wireless service provider to buy enough spectrum based on
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a long-term contract so as to sustain its peak load, which may only last for
brief periods. This inefficiency of long-term spectrum allocation, as prevalent
today, motivates the need for dynamic spectrum access — wherein a wireless
service provider only obtains sufficient spectrum to support the “typical” traf-
fic demands and can (i) purchase additional spectrum on-demand from other
providers to satisfy higher traffic demands, or (ii) offer the spare spectrum to
other providers for profit when there is lower traffic demand.
While dynamic spectrum access is attractive and it is now technically
feasible to dynamically change spectrum on-the-fly [35, 78, 93], an important
open issue remains how to share spectrum across multiple parties. It is essen-
tial to have an incentive framework that can effectively foster collaboration
while guarding against dishonest behavior.
We aim to achieve the following properties for the double spectrum
auction, where the first three properties are necessary economic properties for
a good double auction and the remaining three quantify the effectiveness of
the auction: (i) Truthfulness: Bidders cannot benefit from bidding differently
from their true valuation; (ii) Individual rationality: Bidders get non-negative
utilities, i.e., sellers are paid no less than their asks and buyers do not pay
more than their bids; (iii) Budget-balance: The total amount paid to the sellers
is no more than the total amount received from the buyers. This prevents the
auctioneer, which runs the auction, from losing money; (iv) Efficiency: It is
the difference between the sum of the winning buyers’ valuations and the sum
of the winning sellers’ valuations. To achieve good efficiency, the goods should
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be sold to the buyers that value them the most and be sold by the sellers
that value them the least; (v) Revenue: It is the total amount of payment
from all winning buyers. A winning buyer may pay different amount from its
bid, depending on the auction design. A higher revenue gives sellers stronger
incentive to participate. (vi) Utilization: Unique to spectrum auctions, we
seek to maximize spectrum resource utilization by allowing as many buyers as
possible to reuse the same spectrum resources. We quantify the utilization by
the total number of buyers that are assigned spectrum.
Designing a good double auction for spectrum reuse poses the follow-
ing significant challenges. (i) How to accurately capture wireless interference
among the buyers, which is necessary to support spectrum reuse. Achieving
spectrum reuse, where multiple non-competing buyers use the same resource
simultaneously, is the key property that makes spectrum auction fundamen-
tally different from traditional auction, which assumes all the entities compete
against each other for an item. (ii) How to design a truthful double auction.
Simply applying truthful auctions for the sellers and buyers does not lead to a
truthful double auction. It is also critical to ensure participants cannot gain by
manipulating the interaction between two sides of the market. It is especially
challenging in a spectrum auction because the two sides of the market are
very different. (iii) How to maximize the spectrum utilization while achieving
budget balance. To maximize spectrum utilization, we need to sell as many
channels as possible and let them be concurrently used by as many buyers
as possible. However, this goal conflicts with the budget balance, since sell-
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ing more channels means a lower average price and a possibly lower revenue
(as the price is determined by the loser’s price). A lower revenue means that
fewer channels may be sold in a double auction due to the need to achieve
budget balance. We will further elaborate these challenges using examples in
Section 8.2.
The advantages of double sided spectrum auctions have attracted lots
of research attention. Despite considerable previous work, significant chal-
lenges remain. In particular, some works fail to support spectrum reuse while
preserving truthfulness [83, 90]. The first work that satisfies all economic
properties and supports spectrum reuse is TRUST [95]. It follows the classic
McAfee’s double auction [54], which jointly computes the auction result for
buyers and sellers. However, to apply the classic design, it makes several sim-
plifications that could sacrifice performance. Specifically, it randomly groups
non-interfering buyers and requires buyers in the same group to win or lose
together. So the fate of a group is determined by the lowest bidding buyer. A
group can lose even if it has many high bidding buyers, which results in un-
fairness and low efficiency. It also enforces uniform pricing for all buyers that
win the same channel, in which case the price can be no more than the lowest
bid of these buyers. Thus the total reveue is limited and that further hurts
the auction performance because few channels can be traded while preserving
budget balance. Several follow-up works share similar problems [91, 25].
We develop a novel double auction for dynamic allocation of spectrum
(DA2) in Section 9. DA2 uses separate designs of the buyer and seller side
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auctions while achieving truthfulness, budget balance, and individual rational-
ity. Compared to the classic joint design strategy [54] taken by most existing
spectrum double auction designs [95, 91], a unique advantage of our separate
auction designs for the buyers and sellers is that this enables flexible combi-
nations of different buyer/seller side designs. This significantly increases the
design space and can immediately benefit from future enhancement to auction
design on either buyer or seller side. Moreover, it also allows different prop-
erties of both sides to be captured accurately, which is especially important
for spectrum double auctions since the buyer side is much more complicated
due to wireless interference. We show how to combine the design of two sides
to ensure budget balance and identify the necessary properties of a single side
design in order for the double auction to be truthful.
DA2 consists of three components: (i) seller side auction design, assuing
N channels sell, (ii) buyer side auction design, assuming N channels sell, and
(iii) determining N (i.e., the number of channels) to sell to satisfy budget
balance.
Among them, the buyer side design is the most challenging compo-
nent due to complicated wireless interference relationships among the buyers.
We propose to partition the graph into subgraphs based on the competition
patterns, which gives us the flexibility to compute allocation independently in
each subgraph and then combine the results. In particular, in order to support
frequency reuse, buyers are grouped into independent sets, where buyers in the
same independent set do not interfere. The performance of an auction is sensi-
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tive to the independent set construction. However, the independent sets should
be constructed in a bid-independent fashion to ensure truthfulness [95]. Graph
partition reduces the randomness of independent set construction, and allows
us to better capture the different competition patterns in each subgraph to
achieve higher revenue by computing pricing in each subgraph independently.
We identify important requirements for a good partitioning algorithm:
cutting as few edges as possible while yielding balanced partitions. These
two requirements correspond to the well known metric, called the Normalized
Cut. We apply spectral clustering [60], which is an effective approximation
algorithm to minimize the Normalized Cut. We then use the group bid defini-
tion in [91] to sort the groups and determine potential winners in a subgraph.
To combine the allocation results from subgraphs while preserving truthful-
ness, we develop a novel pairwise merge procedure to merge the results from
two subgraphs at a time, while reducing the efficiency and revenue loss due to
conflicts between subgraphs.
We further extend DA2 to support localized sellers (i.e., sellers that
sell spectrum that can be used by buyers in certain regions) in Section 9.4.
To optimize performance and maximize the number of trades to carry out, we
develop cross-region budget balance to allow regions to help each other and let
a seller win in all regions as long as it is budget balanced in any one region.
Our new allocation algorithm naturally gives a seller’s critical value (i.e., the
highest price that it can ask and still win) and we use it as payment to the
seller.
13
We extensively evaluate our approaches using conflict graphs generated
from real cell tower locations derived from a major US cellular provider (Sec-
tion 10). Our results show that DA2 consistently yields high efficiency, rev-
enue, and utilization, and significantly out-performs the existing approaches.
14
Chapter 2
Friend Discovery in Mobile Social Networks
2.1 Overview
We consider how to identify potential friends in one’s physical vicinity,
which is essential to mobile social network. We assume that users only have
occasional connectivity with a trusted server on the Internet (e.g., once a day)
and immediate communication occurs locally within a mobile social network
and does not need access to the server; moreover the server does not know
users’ locations.
One way to address the privacy and security issues is to take advantage
of a trusted central server, which collects information from individual users,
computes and disseminates the results. Server-based solution is not suitable
for mobile social networks for the following reasons. First, users in a mo-
bile social network may not have direct access to a computer or the Internet.
While cellular data service increases in popularity, the number of data service
subscribers is still very limited due to its high cost [58, 87]. As a result, a
server-based solution cannot work in such an environment unless dedicated
servers are deployed to support mobile social networks, which is prohibitively
expensive if not infeasible. In contrast, a distributed solution is more appeal-
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ing because it obviates the need of always having access to a server. Second,
as people are increasingly concerned about their location privacy and personal
data, they may not want to reveal their current location or other personal
information even to a trusted server. Wills et al. [59, 45] studied 13 mobile
online social networks, such as Facebook, Friendster, Hi5, LinkedIn, MySpace,
Twitter, and found all of them leaked some private information to tracking
sites and several of them passed users’ location information to a third party.
Third, the server can easily become a bottleneck, a single point of failure,
and the target for denial-of-service attack. These limitations of server-based
approach motivate us to move away from a centralized solution and design
distributed secure protocols for friend discovery in mobile social networks.
Before we introduce our solution, in this chapter we first provide some
background on coordinate-based proximity estimation. Then we identify po-
tential attacks against friend discoveery, using real social network data.
2.2 Coordinate-based Proximity Estimation
In this section, we first introduce the notion of proximity measure and
describe how one can compute social proximity based on social coordinate.
Our key assumption is that users are already part of a common (online or
physical) social network. We can then identify potential friends by checking
whether two users are sufficiently close in this social network.
Proximity measure in social networks. A social network [85] is a so-
16
cial structure modeled as a graph, where nodes represent people and edges
represent relationships between them (e.g., friendship). A central concept in
social networks is proximity measure, which quantifies the closeness or sim-
ilarity between nodes in a social network. Proximity measure serves as the
basis for many social network applications (e.g., [34, 14, 28, 92]). As a result,
a variety of proximity measures have been proposed. The simplest proximity
measures include the number of common neighbors or the number of common
attributes between the two users. More sophisticated proximity measures in-
volve infinite sums over the ensemble of all paths between two nodes in the
social networks (e.g., Katz measure [42], rooted PageRank [49, 50], and escape
probability [79]). Compared with simple proximity measures, path-ensemble
based proximity measures capture more information about the underlying so-
cial structure and have been shown to be more effective in social networks
[49, 50, 79]. In particular, the Katz measure is shown to be particularly ef-
fective in predicting new links in social networks [49, 50, 76]. It is defined as
Katz[x, y] =
∑∞
ℓ=1 β
ℓ
Katz · |paths
〈ℓ〉
x,y| (2.2.1)
where paths〈ℓ〉x,y is the set of length-ℓ paths from x to y in a social network,
and β
Katz
< 1 is a damping factor. We focus on computing Katz measure
in our evaluation, but our protocols are general and can be applied to many
other proximity measures including those simple proximity measures, since
proximity computation can be considered as a dot product operation (also
known as the inner product) without loss of generality (as shown below).
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Estimating proximity from social coordinates. [76] developed a tech-
nique called proximity embedding for efficient and accurate computation of
path-ensemble based proximity measure (e.g., Katz measure, rooted PageR-
ank, escape probability) in large social networks with millions of nodes. It
approximates the entire m×m proximity matrix P , where P (i, j) denotes the
proximity between users i and j, as the product of two rank-r factor matri-
ces U and V , where m can be millions but r is much smaller (e.g., r = 30):
Pm×m ≈ Um×r · V
T
m×r While proximity embedding was originally designed for
centralized social network analysis [76], once the decomposition P ≈ UV T
becomes available, we can immediately use U and V to enable efficient, dis-
tributed computation of social proximity. Specifically, each node i is associated
with a pair of vectors U [i, ∗] and V [i, ∗], which we term as i’s social coordinates
since they represent a user’s position in the social network. The proximity from
node i to node j can then be approximated as the dot product of their social
coordinates U [i, ∗] and V [j, ∗], which can be efficiently computed in O(r) time.
Similarly, the proximity from node j to node i is simply the dot product of
U [j, ∗] and V [i, ∗].
In addition, dot product can be used to compute many other proximity
measures. For example, given a global list of attributes, each user is assigned a
vector with 0s or 1s, where 0 means that the user does not have the attribute
and 1 otherwise. The dot product of two vectors essentially captures the
number of matches between two users and can also be used to predict new
friendship. When the list gets too long, a bloom filter can be used to summarize
18
the list in a compact fashion. One can then estimate the similarity between
two sets based on the dot product of the corresponding two bloom filters. As
another example, consider two feature vectors u and v. If we normalize them
to have unit length, the dot product u ◦ v gives the cosine similarity between
the two feature vectors.
A main component of our solution for secure proximity computation
is the first secure dot product protocol that is both privacy-preserving and
verifiable. Since secure dot product is a fundamental primitive in privacy-
preserving data mining and secure multi-party computation, our technique
can have many applications beyond mobile social networks.
Problem formulation. The social coordinates for individual users can be
precomputed by a trusted central server in the social network that users belong
to. For example, one can imagine that existing online social networking site,
such as Facebook and MySpace, to provide such a service. Our goal then is
to determine whether the dot product of two users’ social coordinates exceeds
a given threshold. Only when the dot product is large enough, will the two
users start further communication. We want such computation to be efficient,
privacy-preserving, and verifiable: (i) no user can forge social coordinates or
the result of dot product without getting caught, and (ii) if the dot product
between two users is below the threshold, they learn only this fact and nothing
more.
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2.3 Attack Models
Adversaries are curious about other users’ personal information and
location information and will try their best to extract information from every
message. They may also lie or even collude in order to get more information.
Below we identify a range of potential attacks against coordinate-based social
proximity computation and quantify their effectiveness using analysis of real
traces.
Compromising location privacy. A number of attacks can be launched
to breach a user’s location privacy based on her social coordinate or her social
proximity to a known social coordinate. We identify four such attacks below.
• Fingerprinting users based on social coordinates. A naive way to sup-
port proximity computation is to let every user publish her social coordinate
for computing dot product. However, if the social coordinates of a user are rel-
atively unique, it becomes easy to identify a user based on them. To assess the
potency of such an attack, we use five popular social networks: Digg, Flickr,
LiveJournal, MySpace and YouTube, as shown in Table 2.1. Figure 2.1(a)
plots the percentage of unique social coordinates in a given social network as
a function of the number of digits used to represent one dimension in each
coordinate. The curve is based on the first snapshot but the results from the
second snapshot are similar. It is evident from the figure that with just 4
decimal-point precision, which is required for accurately computing proximity
metric between any user pair, 35%-80% of the users become uniquely identi-
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fiable by their social coordinates. Even with 1 decimal point precision, there
are still 5%-50% unique social coordinates. Further inspection suggests that
most non-unique social coordinates belong to socially inactive users with few
friends. For example, all users with zero friends have the same all-zero so-
cial coordinate. To illustrate this effect, Figure 2.1(b) plots the percentage of
unique social coordinates for users with at least five friends. We see a dra-
matic increase in the fraction of unique social coordinates. Therefore, social
coordinate based fingerprinting is more potent against socially active users.
Network Date # Connected nodes Links
Digg 9/15/2008 535,071 4,432,726
10/25/2008 567,771 4,813,668
Flickr 3/01/2007 1,932,735 26,702,209
4/15/2007 2,172,692 30,393,940
LiveJournal 11/13/2008 1,769,493 61,488,262
12/05/2008 1,769,543 61,921,736
MySpace 12/11/2008 2,128,945 89,138,628
1/11/2009 2,137,773 90,629,452
YouTube 4/30/2007 2,012,280 9,762,825
6/15/2007 2,532,050 13,017,064
Table 2.1: Dataset summary.
• Fingerprinting users based on social proximity. Even if the social
coordinates are encrypted, a smart adversary can try to infer the social coor-
dinates based on the proximity metric. This is demonstrated by the following
analysis. Figure 2.2 shows the uniqueness of the dot product value between a
users’ social coordinate and a given random coordinate that an attacker would
use. As we can see, with 1 decimal point precision, 5-55% of all users are
uniquely identifiable; as the precision increases to 4 decimal points, around
30-80% of the users are uniquely identifiable. Moreover, the fraction of unique
21
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of unique social coordinates as a function of precision.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of unique dot products as a function of precision.
social proximity is much higher among users with at least five friends. So
social proximity based fingerprinting is a more serious attack against socially
active users.
• Inferring social coordinates from proximity measure. Apart from act-
ing as an identifier, knowing exact proximity to a given user may even allow
an adversary to reconstruct a user’s social coordinates. Specifically, since the
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proximity between two users is a dot product between their coordinates, each
proximity value gives one linear constraint on the social coordinates of the
other party. An adversary just needs d linearly independent constraints to
reconstruct a d-dimension social coordinate. This can be achieved by hav-
ing an adversary generate d (fake) linearly independent coordinates and then
compute the proximity with an intended victim, using each of the d different
coordinates or having d colluding adversaries.
• Binary search on social proximity. The above attacks suggest that we
should protect privacy of both social coordinates and proximity measure. In
order to facilitate the decision of whether to make friends with a user, ideally
we only want to reveal 1 bit of information, i.e., whether the dot product is
above or below a threshold (instead of its exact value). However, even this
1 bit of information could be potentially exploited by a patient adversary to
launch a binary search attack that adaptively adjusts the threshold to quickly
narrow down the value range for the social proximity between the victim and
a social coordinate chosen by the adversary.
Tracking users. We further observe that social coordinates are relatively
stable over time. Figure 2.3 plots the cumulative distribution function of
the cosine similarity (which measures the angle between two vectors) between
a user’s social coordinates across the two snapshots indicated in Table 2.1
for all the social networks. As shown in Figure 2.3, for most networks, a
large fraction of users’ coordinates have high cosine similarity across the two
snapshots. 50-60% people in Digg and Flickr have social coordinates’ cosine
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similarity as high as 0.9, and about 90% of users in MySpace have cosine
similarity over 0.9. Such high stability in social coordinates indicates that an
adversary could potentially link social coordinate announcements at different
times, locations, and networks to the same user and enable continuous user
tracking.
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Figure 2.3: CDF of cosine similarity of social coordinates in two snapshots.
Other attacks. Other attacks include forgery and DoS. Since users rely on
the social coordinates to make friendship decisions, it would be very damaging
if an adversary is able to lie about her social coordinate to trick others in to
believing that the adversary is socially close. Also existing private dot product
computation protocols are not verifiable (e.g., [38, 81]), making it possible to
lie about the computation result. Finally, an adversary may send many fake
social coordinates for proximity computation and cause overloading at the
victim.
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Chapter 3
Secure Friend Discovery Protocols
3.1 Design Goals
Based on the above attacks, our design goals are as follows:
1. Preserving the privacy of social coordinates. Due to the unique-
ness of social coordinates, we should encrypt social coordinates. Since
each dot product reveals one linear constraint about the social coor-
dinates, d independent constraints would reveal the whole coordinate.
Therefore we should limit the number of linear constraints revealed.
2. Preserving the privacy of social proximity. Due to uniqueness of
proximity values and the possibility of reconstructing social coordinates
based on proximity values, ideally a scheme should just reveal whether
the proximity value is below or above a threshold used for making friend-
ship decisions, while protecting against binary search attacks.
3. Preventing user tracking. Even when a user’s social coordinate does
not change, her social coordinate announcement should look different to
prevent tracking.
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4. Providing authentication and verification. Users should not be
able to forge their social coordinates. Any user should be able to au-
thenticate another user’s identity and verify if the social coordinate used
for computation is valid.
5. Efficient filtering. Since a user is interested in quickly finding potential
friends and the number of potential friends is usually much smaller than
the total number of users in the network, we should efficiently filter out
social coordinates with low proximity values.
3.2 Overview
To achieve the above design goals, we develop a novel secure prox-
imity computation protocol, which consists of three major components: (i)
authentication without long-term linkability (Section 3.3), (ii) efficient and
privacy-preserving proximity pre-filtering (Section 3.4), and (iii) private and
verifiable proximity computation (Section 3.5).
In (i), we leverage the idea of virtual ID to remove long-term linkability
and prevent user tracking, and we use digital signatures for authentication.
The proximity prefiltering in (ii) allows users to quickly filter out users that
are unlikely to become friends. However it does not prevent an adversary
from forging social coordinates or the final proximity result. So we further
develop a technique for private and verifiable proximity computation based on
homomorphic cryptography in (iii) to check the validity of social coordinates
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and proximity result.
The step (iii) is only invoked when proximity pre-filtering determines
that the proximity exceeds the threshold because (i) homomorphic cryptogra-
phy is computationally expensive and should be called upon only when neces-
sary, for verification, and (ii) this step reveals the exact proximity value. It is
unacceptable to reveal the exact proximity value to an arbitrary user, which
can easily compromise location privacy (see Section 2.3). However, we believe
that it is acceptable to reveal the exact proximity value to those users that are
sufficiently close socially and thus likely to become friends. A lying adversary
can get caught by this step and reported.
3.3 Authentication Without Long-Term Linkability
When two strangers encounter each other, proximity computation needs
to be performed on their social coordinates though they may not trust each
other. To support authentication in such an untrusted environment, we re-
quire a trusted server, which can be the same server that computes social
coordinates. Note that the server is only used for bootstrapping trust. It does
not need to be contacted in a mobile social network.
To protect Alice’s identity and prevent long-term linkability, the trusted
server assigns Alice a separate virtual ID, which is the only ID sent during
communication. The virtual ID is essentially a temporary private/public key
pair, which is valid for only a specified time period. Alice needs to get her
new virtual ID by contacting the trusted server when it is reachable. Every
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time Alice contacts the server, the server can use standard digital signature
techniques to authenticate Alice (as in Internet server) before issuing her new
virtual ID.
After authenticating Alice, the server sends Alice her new virtual ID,
expiration time, encrypted social coordinates, and the server’s digital signa-
ture. Others can use the server’s signature and Alice’s own signature to au-
thenticate Alice and her encrypted social coordinates. The encrypted social
coordinates are used for computation in a verifiable secure dot product pro-
tocol introduced in Section 3.5. In this way, we cannot link messages sent
before and after changing virtual IDs, which prevents long-term linkability.
To reduce the frequency of contacting the server, the server may issue Alice
multiple virtual IDs at a time, each with a different valid period.
3.4 Proximity Pre-filtering
The goal of proximity pre-filtering is to quickly identify potential friends
from all the users in a mobile social network. Our requirement is to efficiently
compute whether the proximity between two social coordinates is below or
above a threshold without revealing the actual social coordinates or the exact
proximity. The threshold depends on a user’s interest in making new friends.
In this step, we do not verify the correctness of the coordinates or proximity
values, which will be handled by the private and verifiable proximity compu-
tation in Section 3.5.
There are several existing protocols that compute dot product while
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preserving the privacy of the vectors (e.g., [38, 81]), however they reveal the
final value of the dot product to one of the parties and do not satisfy our
requirements (i.e., preserve the privacy of the proximity value and only reveal
whether it is above or below the threshold). We first review one of the existing
secure dot product proposed [38], which we use as the basis for our protocol.
Then we present our modifications to achieve our design goal.
Existing secure dot product protocol [38]. Suppose Alice has a d-
dimensional vector v and Bob has a d-dimensional vector u. s is a security
parameter that controls the amount of random information we use to hide the
social coordinate.
1. Alice initiates the dot product computation by asking Bob to start the
computation. Bob constructs a s× (d + 1) matrix X. Its i-th row xi is
defined as
xi =
{
〈u1, u2, . . . , ud, 1〉, i = r,
ki, ∀i 6= r,
(3.4.1)
where r is a randomly chosen row, which contains the social coordinate,
and the other row vectors ki (i 6= r) are all randomly generated.
Bob also creates an s×s random matrixQ, a random (d+1)-dimensional
vector f , and three random numbers r1, r2, r3. He computes the following
five terms: (i) b =
∑s
i=1Qir, (ii) c =
∑s
i=1,i6=r(xi ·
∑s
j=1Qji), (iii) Q ·X,
(iv) c′ = c+ r1 · r2 · f , and (v) g = r1 · r3 · f . Bob then sends Q ·X, c
′, g
to Alice.
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2. Alice chooses a random number α and creates a vector v′ = 〈v1, v2, ....vd, α〉.
Alice then computes the following four terms: (i) y = Q · X · v′, (ii)
z =
∑s
i=1 yi, (iii) a = z − c
′ ◦ v′, and (iv) h = g ◦ v′. Here v1 ◦ v2
represents the dot product (i.e., inner product) of two given vectors v1
and v2. Alice then sends a and h to Bob.
3. Bob computes β = a+h·(r2/r3)
b
and sends it to Alice.
4. Alice computes β −α, which is the desired dot product as shown in [38]
(i.e., β − α = v ◦ u).
Proximity pre-filtering. Since in the last step of the above protocol the
dot product is given by β −α, a simple way to hide the true dot product is to
let Alice choose a threshold T and send T +α to Bob. If β is larger than T +α,
Bob replies YES; otherwise he replies NO. The problem with this approach is
that Bob can guess a reasonable T in this system, and with T + α and β he
can estimate β − α, which is the dot product.
To address this issue, we propose a proximity pre-filtering protocol by
making the following modifications to the original secure dot product protocol.
At the beginning of the protocol, instead of using her real vector, Alice uses
a scaled version of her vector ρ · v, where ρ is a random number chosen by
Alice. At the end of the protocol, along with a and h, Alice also picks another
random number ρ′ such that 0 ≤ ρ′ < ρ, computes γ = α + ρ · T + ρ′ and
sends γ to Bob. Bob compares γ with β, and replies YES only when β > γ,
and otherwise replies No. All the other operations remain the same as [38].
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Correctness. Since Alice scales her vector by ρ, we have β−α = ρ ·p, where
p is the dot product. β − γ = β − α − ρ · T − ρ′ = ρ · (p − T )− ρ′. Given p
and T are both integers, we have that β > γ implies p > T and β < γ implies
p ≤ T .
Setting the threshold. Allowing users to set an arbitrary threshold T
is undesirable since users do not have the knowledge and it complicates liar
detection. We assume a system suggests minimum threshold for all users.
Users can set a higher threshold to be more selective but are prohibited from
setting lower thresholds than the suggested value. Therefore whenever the
outcome of proximity prefiltering is YES the proximity value must be larger
than this suggested minimum threshold, which can be used as groundtruth for
liar detection.
3.5 Private and Verifiable Proximity Computation
Proximity pre-filtering alone is insufficient because adversaries can fal-
sify their social coordinates or the final proximity result. In this section, we
develop a solution to address these issues. It achieves both privacy and verifi-
ability, which are two conflicting goals in secure multi-party computation. We
first introduce an existing homomorphic protocol for computing a dot product.
It preserves privacy but does not provide authentication or verification. Then
we describe our approach to provide both privacy and verification.
Homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption is an effective solu-
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Public key: (g, n), Private key: σ
Encryption:
Plaintext m < n
Select random r < n
Ciphertext c = E(m, r) = gm+nrmod n2
Decryption:
Ciphertext c < n2
Plaintext m = D(c) = L(c
σmod n2)
L(gσmod n2)
mod n, where L(u) = u−1
n
Figure 3.1: The fast variant of Paillier’s Cryptosystem
tion to privacy-preserving computation. It allows certain algebraic operations
on the plaintext to be performed using (possibly different) algebraic operations
directly on the ciphertext. There are several homomorphic cryptosystems. We
use the fast variant of Paillier’s cryptosystem [63], shown in Figure 3.1. Its
semantic security relies on the premise that the Decisional Partial Discrete
Logarithm Problem [63] is hard. This cryptosystem has the following two
useful properties:
1. Additive Homomorphic Property: Multiplication of the ciphertexts re-
sults in addition of the plaintexts:
E(m1, r1)E(m2, r2) mod n
2= E(m1 +m2, r1 + r2)
E(m1, r1)
m2 mod n2= E(m1 ·m2, r1 ·m2)
2. Self-Blinding Property: Any ciphertext can be changed to another with-
out affecting the plaintext:
D(E(m, r1)) = D(E(m, r1 + r2))
For our protocol, we expect the trusted server to generate the required
keys and send them to the user in addition to the virtual ID information
specified in Section 3.3.
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Homomorphic dot product protocol. A secure dot product protocol has
been proposed based on homomorphic encryption [29]. It achieves the design
goal that Alice gets the dot product, but neither Alice nor Bob learns any other
useful information about other party’s vector, under certain security assump-
tions. To summarize, let H+A and H
+
B denote Alice and Bob’s homomorphic
public keys, respectively. Suppose Alice’s vector is v = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vd〉 and
Bob’s vector is u = 〈u1, u2, . . . , ud〉. The protocol works as follows:
1. For each dimension of vector v, Alice generates a random number ri and
sends EH+
A
(vi, ri) to Bob.
2. Bob computes w =
∏d
i=1 EH+A
(vi, ri)
ui (we will refer to this operation as
multiplication throughout our paper), generates a random number r′, and
sends w′ = w · EH+
A
(0, r′) back to Alice.
3. Alice then decrypts w′ to get the dot product.
This protocol is provably privacy-preserving. However, it assumes an
honest-but-curious adversary model and provides neither authentication nor
verification. Malicious participants can lie about their encrypted vectors and
the resulting dot product of the two vectors, since Bob knows Alice’s public
key and can encrypt an arbitrary value to send back to Alice instead of the
real dot product. In the rest of the paper we refer to this protocol as Protocol
0.
Designing a verifiable secure dot product protocol. Authentication
and verification are essential to guard against malicious users who falsify the
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social coordinates and proximity metric. Section 3.3 describes authentication,
and below we discuss how to make the protocol verifiable.
Note that for both parties to obtain the dot product, both Alice and
Bob run two separate instances of protocol in parallel. Then, a na¨ıve ver-
ification approach for Bob may be to first decrypt the result sent by Alice
using his private key and encrypt it using Alice’s public key and compare if
it with w that he computed before for consistency. However, since encryption
in Paillier’s cryptosystem involves a random number, the same plaintext does
not generate the same ciphertext, causing this approach to fail.
Suppose Alice picks r1 = 〈r11, r12, . . . , r1d〉 as her random numbers and
Bob picks r2 = 〈r21, r22, . . . , r2d〉 as his random numbers. Let r
′
1 and r
′
2 be
the numbers used for self-blinding by Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice’s en-
crypted vector is EH+
A
(v, r1) = 〈EH+
A
(v1, r11),EH+
A
(v2, r12), . . . ,EH+
A
(vd, r1d)〉, and
Bob’s encrypted vector EH+
B
(u, r2) is similar.
In order to solve the verification problem, we observe that when the
fast variant of Paillier’s cryptosystem is used, the value computed by Alice
(before self-blinding) is EH+
B
(v ◦ u, r2 ◦ v). This is because
d∏
i=1
EH+
B
(ui, r2i)
vi =
d∏
i=1
EH+
B
(ui · vi, r2i · vi) = EH+
B
(v ◦ u, r2 ◦ v)
Assume Alice decrypts the result received from Bob and gets result1, with-
out knowing r2 ◦ v, Alice cannot generate EH+
B
(result1, r2 ◦ v) to test the
consistency with EH+
B
(v ◦ u, r2 ◦ v) computed by herself.
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To overcome such difficulty, below we design two protocols that support
verification and at the same time let users use different random vectors for
encryption.
Verifiable secure dot product protocol 1: Here, we apply Protocol 0 to
compute r2 ◦v in addition to v ◦u so that the dot product value obtained can
be verified.
1. As in Protocol 0, Alice and Bob start by exchanging their encrypted vectors
EH+
A
(v, r1) and EH+
B
(u, r2).
2. Alice computes EH+
B
(v ◦ u, r2 ◦ v) and EH+
B
(r1 ◦ u, r1 ◦ r2) and send them
to Bob after self-blinding. Bob computes EH+
A
(v ◦ u, r1 ◦ u) and EH+
A
(r2 ◦
v, r1 ◦ r2) and also send them after self-blinding.
3. Alice decrypts and gets two numbers result1 and result2, which are sup-
posed to be v ◦ u and r2 ◦ v. Alice computes EH+
B
(result1, result2) and
compares with EH+
B
(v ◦ u, r2 ◦ v). If they are consistent, the dot product
result1 is correct. Bob decrypts and verifies in the same way.
To ensure that Alice can properly decrypt v ◦ u and r2 ◦ v in step 3 of
the protocol, we require that v◦u < nA and r2◦v < nA, where (gA, nA) = H
+
A
is Alice’s homomorphic public key given in Figure 3.1. This can be achieved
by limiting the number of bits of each element in u, v and r2. In our current
implementation, nA has 1024 bits, each element in u and v is a 32-bit integer,
and the number of dimensions d is a 16-bit integer. As a result, each element
in r2 can have as many as 1024− 16− 32 = 976 bits without causing r2 ◦v to
35
exceed nA. Such a large number of bits suffice to defend attacks that enumerate
all possible ciphertexts for certain plaintext in a brute-force fashion.
Compared to the original Protocol 0, our new protocol has slightly more
communication overhead and more than twice computation overhead since it
computes two dot products using the Protocol 0 and has a verification phase,
which is essentially an encryption. Also note that the second dot product
incurs more computation overhead because the elements of the random vec-
tors can be much larger than elements of v and u. Therefore, we call the
multiplication operation with random vector as BigMul. Next we develop a
light-weight protocol with much less computation overhead, but slightly more
communication overhead.
Verifiable secure dot product protocol 2: The idea is to only com-
pute v ◦ u using Protocol 0 and compute r2 ◦ v using the secure dot product
protocol [38], which is much cheaper than the homomorphic protocol.
1. Alice and Bob exchange their encrypted vectors EH+
A
(v, r1) and EH+
B
(u, r2)
as before.
2. Alice computes EH+
B
(v ◦ u, r2 ◦ v) and sends it to Bob after self-blinding.
Bob computes EH+
A
(v ◦ u, r1 ◦ u) and does the same thing.
3. Alice uses the secure dot product protocol [38] to compute v◦r2 with Bob.
We denote the result she gets from this step as result2. Similarly, Bob
uses secure dot product protocol to compute u ◦ r1.
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4. Alice decrypts the received message from step 2 and get result1. With
result1 and result2, verification is the same as Protocol 1. The same
holds for Bob.
Compared to Protocol 0, the additional computation cost is close to just
one more encryption for verification, since the additional secure dot product
computation is much cheaper than the encryption. In terms of communication,
the secure dot product protocol requires at least four messages, which slightly
increases communication cost. Since the computation cost dominates, the
small increase in communication is worthwhile.
Homomorphic encryption with negative numbers: Negative numbers
in the social coordinates do not affect the correctness of the protocols since
the homomorphic properties still hold. A negative dot product can cause
ambiguity on the results because the decrypted result x may imply that the
original result may be x, x − n, or x − 2 · n, etc. To handle this issue, we
leverage the fact that n is a 1024-bit number, which is huge, whereas all
proximity values comparatively small. Therefore, whenever the proximity is
too large (i.e., > n/2), this indicates that the real value is negative and the
actual result is result− n.
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3.6 Security Analysis
3.6.1 Proximity Pre-filtering
Here we analyze the information flow between Alice and Bob. The first
several steps of our protocol are the same as the secure dot product protocol,
except that we scale the coordinate. As shown in [38], from Bob to Alice,
Q ·X, c′ and g do not leak any information. From Alice to Bob, h reveals
one equation about Alice’s coordinate v. This is possible because we have two
relationships h = g◦v′ and β = p+α; canceling out α from both relationships
give us one constraint on v. Now we consider the additional information flow
introduced in our protocol. The final result from Bob to Alice contains 1 bit
information, which is the outcome of the protocol and required. From Alice to
Bob, γ reveals ρ · (p− T )− ρ′. So essentially we hide p− T using two random
numbers ρ and ρ′. [43] used the same hiding technique in Yao’s millionaire’s
protocol, which is shown to be secure when the range of ρ is big enough and
one can increase the difficulty of guessing p − T by randomly using many
possible distributions for choosing random numbers. It will reveal p = T only
when ρ · (p− T )− ρ′ = 0, which occurs with a very low probability.
Next we examine if binary search is still possible. There are two ways
to perform binary search: (i) an adversary computes proximity measure with
the victim multiple times, each time using a different threshold, or (ii) an ad-
versary colludes with others and fakes the same social coordinate and compute
proximity measure between the fake coordinate with the victim’s coordinate
multiple times, each time using a different threshold. The first attack can be
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easily prevented by permitting only one proximity computation between any
two users. To defend the second attack, we note that in binary search about
half of the trials will have YES result. Whenever the result is YES, we run
our verifiable secure dot product protocol, which will detect the liar. So bi-
nary search is still possible, but each trial will be caught with 50% probability
and the success probability of binary search exponentially decreases with the
number of trials involved in binary search.
The pre-filtering protocol does not have authentication or verification
on the vectors used by participants. It is easy for either side to manipulate the
final result. Alice can manipulate γ and make the result NO even when the
real result is YES. This means that Alice decides not to make friend with Bob
despite the high proximity measure, which should be permitted as Alice should
have freedom to choose friends even when the proximity measure exceeds Bob’s
threshold. Similarly, Bob is allowed to reply NO when the actual result is YES.
But anyone that makes the result YES while it is actually NO is considered
cheating and can be detected by our verifiable secure dot product protocol.
3.6.2 Private and Verifiable Proximity Computation
Theorem 1 (Privacy of Coordinates in Protocol 1). Assuming the fast variant
of Paillier’s cryptosystem is semantically secure, Alice and Bob only get the
dot product and no more useful information about each other’s coordinate.
Proof. Assuming the cryptosystem is semantically secure, Protocol 0 reveals
no useful information other than the result [29]. In Protocol 1, each participant
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gets two dot product by running two instances of Protocol 0. Thus each of
them gets no more useful information than two dot products. The extra dot
product used for verification, i.e., r2 ◦ v, does not reveal more information
about u because r2 is hard to guess. In fact, guessing r2 based on r2 ◦ v is
just as hard as guessing u based on v ◦ u.
Theorem 2 (Privacy of Coordinates in Protocol 2). Assuming the fast variant
of Paillier’s cryptosystem is semantically secure, Alice and Bob get the dot
product and one more linear constraint about the other party’s coordinate.
Proof. The only difference between Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 is that in Proto-
col 2 result2 is computed using secure dot product protocol [38], which reveals
one more constraint about the other user’s coordinate.
Theorem 3 (Verification Guarantee). If Alice’s verification is successful in
Protocol 1 or Protocol 2, Alice gets the real dot product.
Proof. The only case when verification is successful but Alice gets a wrong
number is Bob found two numbers result1 < n and result2 < n such that
result1 6= v ◦u, EH+
B
(result1, result2) = EH+
B
(v ◦u, r2 ◦v). This is impossible
because decryption result is unique in Paillier’s cryptosystem.
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Chapter 4
Friend Discovery Protocol Evaluation
We implement our protocols on HP IPAQ 910, which has Marvell
PXA270 416 MHz Processor, 128 MB RAM, Windows Mobile 6.1 Professional
operating system, 802.11 b/g WiFi card, and .NET Compact Framework.
Since the cryptosystem involves very large numbers, which is not supported by
the Compact Framework, we use a public BigInteger Library for C# [16]. The
communication uses 802.11b ad hoc mode. We also implemented all computa-
tions in all the protocols on Motorola Droid. It has 550 MHz Arm Cortex A8
processor, 230 MB RAM, and uses Java and the Android development toolkit.
We use a publicly available implementation [64] of Paillier’s Cryptosystem
in Java as a basis for our Fast Variant implementation. Since the Android
Platform has not yet supported wireless ad-hoc mode, we quantify the com-
munication cost using 802.11b infrastructure mode. For comparison, we also
evaluate our protocols on a laptop PC with Windows Vista system, P8600 pro-
cessor, and 2GB memory. Our implementation uses Java. We perform power
measurement on the Droid using PowerTutor [69]. All the implementations
use 30-dimension social coordinates.
41
Device Mean Max Min Std Median
PC 0.44 2.15 0.29 0.30 0.32
IPAQ 172 633 44 78 154
Droid 44 112 22 23 23
Table 4.1: Execution time of proximity prefiltering (ms)
4.1 Proximity Pre-filtering
The efficiency of pre-filtering depends on the security parameter s,
which controls the amount of random information we add. We use s = 2
in our evaluation as in [38].
This protocol altogether involves 4 messages: (i) a control message to
initiate proximity pre-filtering, (ii) a reply containing a matrix and two vectors,
which has altogether (s + 2) · (d + 1) numbers, (iii) a response containing
3 numbers, and (iv) a final answer containing 1-bit: either YES or NO to
the question whether the proximity exceeds the threshold. The message size
depends on the selected random numbers.
Table 4.1 shows the mean, maximum, minimum and average execution
time for prefiltering over 100 runs, for PC, IPAQ and Droid. The average time
is 0.17 second on the IPAQ and 0.044 second on the Droid. Both times are
fast enough for practical use.
4.2 Private and Verifiable Proximity Computation
We implement both versions of our verifiable secure dot product pro-
tocols. Our implementation is based on the fast variant of the Paillier’s cryp-
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PC
Operation Mean Max Min Std Median
Authentication 0.48 1.31 0.37 0.12 0.46
Encryption 77.79 96.07 76.77 2.23 77.20
Decryption 14.11 17 13 0.5667 14
Multiplication 81.92 124 78 5.25 81
BigMul 2253.8 2581 2223 52.02 2238
Self-blinding 83 120 81 4.73 82
Verification 82.43 93 80 2.27 82
IPAQ
Operation Mean Max Min Std Median
Authentication 27.02 61 24 7.7485 25
Decryption 2193.2 2620 2176 48.3319 2178
Multiplication 4055.2 6033 2312 1134.7 4146
BigMul 382026 390237 375463 7523.6 380378
Self-blinding 12615 13353 12280 196.74 12606
Verification 12807 14270 12452 240.10 12776
Droid
Operation Mean Max Min Std Median
Authentication 2.54 54.4 2.23 3.01 2.32
Decryption 27.01 63 24 8.6416 24
Multiplication 160.41 554 150 44.5594 153
BigMul 3780.7 4250 3733 71.48 3760.5
Self-blinding 144.69 596 136 47.6366 137
Verification 144.18 192 136 14.1581 138
Table 4.2: Breakdown of computation time (ms)
tosystem, where n has 1024 bits and σ has 160 bits according to [63]. The
random numbers used have 900 bits, big enough to prevent brute force chosen
plaintext attacks.
Table 4.2 shows the breakdown of the computation time on PC, IPAQ,
and Droid. Protocol 1 involves one authentication, one multiplication, one
BigMul, two self-blindings, two decryptions, and one verification. Protocol 2
includes one authentication, one multiplication, one self-blinding, one decryp-
tion, one secure dot product protocol [38], and one verification. We do not
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Protocol Power Consumption (mJ)
Announcement - precompute 0.4773
Announcement - identify 2.907
Proximity Prefiltering 43.388
Protocol 1 2277.9
Protocol 2 286.3608
Table 4.3: CPU power consumption on Droid
show the performance of secure dot product protocol because it has almost
the same performance as the proximity pre-filtering shown in Table 4.1. As
we would expect, the PC is faster than Droid, which is faster than IPAQ. The
average computation time for protocol 1 is 2.61 seconds on PC, 4.4 seconds on
Droid, and 6 minutes on IPAQ. The time for protocol 2 is 0.276 seconds on PC,
0.523 seconds on Droid, and 31.869 seconds on IPAQ. The difference between
computation time on IPAQ and Droid comes from two factors: (i) the IPAQ
is older and has a slower processor, and (ii) more importantly, the built-in
Java BigInteger implementation is much more efficient than C# implementa-
tion [16] for the IPAQ. Microsoft is planning to introduce built-in BigInteger
class in their new .NET framework and we expect the running time on IPAQ
can reduce significantly with a more efficient library. The server pre-computes
vector encryption on behalf of a mobile host. The time to perform encryption
for a single dimension on PC is 77.79 ms, as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.3 shows CPU power consumption for running protocol 1 and
2 on Droid. To put the number into perspective, a fully charged Droid has
18,648,000 mJ. So the computation involved in the two protocols consume
0.0122% and 0.0015% total power, respectively. These numbers indicate that
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both protocols are practical in terms of power, as well.
In terms of operation, BigMul is the most expensive since it includes
d 900-bit random numbers. Self-blinding cost also depends on the random
number used (900 bits). In our evaluation, we do not use negative numbers.
While negative numbers affect the performance of multiplication (since raising
a negative power requires an inverse operation), their influence can be elimi-
nated by letting the server pre-compute the inverse of each dimension in the
encrypted vector and giving them to users. This increases the communication
cost between users without leaking more information.
In terms of message sizes, for protocol 1, request message contains the
homomorphic public key (n, g) and encrypted vector. n is a 1024-bit number,
and g has at most 2048 bits. The encrypted vector has d encrypted numbers,
each with at most 2048 bits. Hence the total request message is at most
8064 bytes for 30-dimensional social coordinates. The reply message contains
two encrypted numbers, each having at most 2048 bits. So the total size is
within 512 bytes. Protocol 2 contains only one encrypted number in the reply
but involves 4 additional messages as in proximity prefiltering (described in
Section 4.1) except the last message contains the dot product value instead
of YES or NO, and Alice does not send γ, and the numbers are much bigger
because one participant is now using the random vector. The total message
size in our implementation is around 8900 bytes for protocol 1 and around 16K
bytes for protocol 2. The exact value may vary depending on the encryption
result and the random numbers.
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The largest message among all protocols is the protocol 1 request mes-
sage (8K bytes), which takes 3.96 ms and 0.195 mJ to transmit on average
over 200 runs on the Droid. Hence, the communication cost for the protocols
is not significant compared to the computation costs.
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Chapter 5
iDEAL: Incentivize Cellular Oﬄoading via
Auction
5.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the problem of oﬄoading cellular traffic as
a reverse auction. The oﬄoading is transparent to clients and does not affect
cellular pricing (i.e., users pay for the data usage regardless of whether it is
carried by the cellular provider or third party resource owners).
Basic auction settings: Consider a cellular network A which is interested
in purchasing and leveraging spare resources from third-party Wi-Fi hotspots
to satisfy traffic demands from its customers. The third-party hotspot owners
should be rewarded for opening up their services to A’s customers. To facilitate
such cooperation, provider A can set up an auction to let third-party hotspot
owners submit bids to offer their network resources, e.g., dollars per bit-rate
for unit time (e.g., 1 hour) that a third-party hotspot owner offers.
This problem is naturally formulated as a reverse auction. Since the
demand changes over time, e.g., due to diurnal variations [72], the auction
takes place periodically or whenever demand changes. The auction frequency is
chosen to balance the overhead and the accuracy of traffic demand estimation.
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The cellular network is shared across a relatively large area typically
called a cell site. A site is further sub-divided into three or more sectors. Cel-
lular resource in different sectors is relatively independent so we only consider
a single sector. Same solution can be applied independently to other sectors.
The sector can be considered to be divided into m small regions based on
locations of Wi-Fi hotspots and Wi-Fi range as shown in Figure 5.1. A Wi-Fi
hotspot can satisfy traffic demands only in its region.
Na¨ıve solution: A simple approach is to statically partition the cellular
resource into different regions and determine the amount of Wi-Fi resource
needed in each region based on the amount of user demand in the region.
Then we conduct a local auction within a region to utilize the cellular re-
source and Wi-Fi resources dedicated to the region. We call it static local
auction. While simple, this approach has several important limitations: 1)
Due to limited Wi-Fi coverage, the number of hotspots in a region is limited,
i.e., the competition is limited. However, adequate competition is essential for
an auction based approach to be effective. 2) This formulation treats different
regions equally, however the service provider may view different regions dif-
ferently because different regions may have different spectrum efficiencies due
to different signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR) from the base station. 3)
The static allocation cannot effectively take into account the available Wi-Fi
resources and their bids across different regions. For example, even when a
region has higher traffic demand, we may or may not need to allocate more
cellular resources to the region depending on (i) how many Wi-Fi hotspots
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Figure 5.1: A sample cellular sector and its Wi-Fi regions
are in the region, (ii) what are their prices, and (iii) how the Wi-Fi hotspots
and their prices compare with those in other regions. If there are more Wi-Fi
hotspots in a region offering cheaper bids than in the other regions, we can
allocate less cellular resources.
Design goals: We seek an auction scheme to (i) account for different spatial
coverage of resources, which has not been considered in existing work, (ii) cope
with dynamic traffic demands, (iii) achieve high efficiency, where the winners
in the auction are the hotspot owners who really can provide the service at a
cheaper price, thereby improving the overall system efficiency and social wel-
fare, (iv) promote truthful bidding to prevent bidders from gaming the system,
effectively discover price to ensure that the overall system is efficient, and avoid
unnecessary system fluctuation due to gaming, as unwanted switching between
Wi-Fi and 3G can negatively impact user experience [23], (v) low cost, which
is natural but is challenging to achieve simultaneously with truthfulness, and
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m number of regions in a cellular sector
n number of sellers in a cellular sector
di traffic demand in region i
ci cellular capacity in region i
ei spectrum efficiency of cellular network in region i
z total cellular spectrum usage: z =
∑m
i ci/ei
xj total capacity bought from seller j
pj the unit price seller j asks for
λj the Wi-Fi capacity offered by seller j
F (z) cellular cost function
f(j) the region that seller j belongs to
Table 5.1: Notations.
(vi) guard against collusion.
5.2 Our solution: iDEAL
In this section we introduce our solution: iDEAL. We start by designing
the auction setting that fosters more competition and captures the service
provider’s regional preferences. Then we describe the two stages of iDEAL: (i)
allocation, i.e., determine how to allocate traffic among third-party resource
owners and the cellular network itself to minimize cost given the bids, (ii)
pricing, i.e., decide how much should be paid to individual third-party resource
owners in order to provide enough incentives for them to be truthful. Optimal
allocation does not depend on pricing, but assumes all sellers are truthful.
Pricing depends on the allocation and is designed so that staying truthful is
the seller’s optimal strategy. Table 5.1 summarizes the key notations.
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5.2.1 iDEAL Auction Setting
Third-party Wi-Fi resources and bids: Suppose n third-party hotspot
owners offer their resources to the cellular service provider by submitting their
bids. Let Aj = {λj, pj} denote hotspot owner j’s bid, which indicates hotspot
owner j wants to sell λj amount of bandwidth at a price pj per bit per second.
The bids are non-atomic (i.e., a hotspot owner is willing to sell a part of the
capacity it offers). Function f(j) returns the region where hotspot owner j
sells its capacity (e.g., f(j) = i means hotspot owner j sells its capacity in
region i). For simplicity, we assume that each hotspot owner j sells capacity
in a single region, i.e., regions do not overlap. In Section 5.4, we show how
to extend our approach to support overlapping regions. As Wi-Fi may not
cover the whole sector, areas without Wi-Fi coverage can be treated as special
regions with no Wi-Fi bids.
Cellular resources as a Virtual Bid: Let the traffic demand vector be
D = {d1, d2, ..., dm}, where di is the demand in region i. In order to effectively
leverage both third party and cellular resources, we let the service provider
also participate in the auction by submitting a virtual bid. The virtual bid is
in the form of a cost function F (z), where z is the total amount of spectrum
used in the entire cellular sector. Let ci be the cellular capacity in region i, let
xj be the total capacity bought from hotspot owner j. To satisfy the cellular
traffic demand di in each region i, we must have: ci +
∑
j:f(j)=i xj ≥ di. Since
different regions may have different spectrum efficiency, we denote the actual
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spectrum usage in region i as ci/ei, where ei is the spectrum efficiency in region
i. Thus the total spectrum usage is z =
∑m
i=1 ci/ei.
We consider F (z) to be a piecewise linear convex function, capturing
the fact that below a certain value the cost (reflecting sunk cost [77]) is very
low because the service provider has already invested in buying the spectrum
and needs to keep the system running; as the cellular network becomes more
loaded, the cost increases; and once it is overloaded, the cost increases sharply
to capture the high cost of congestion. Thus z is not limited by the available
spectrum and can go to infinity. A similar convex cost function has been
widely used in modeling congestion cost in the Internet (e.g., [26, 71, 70]).
Because the cellular resource in the virtual bid can be used in any
region in the sector, it introduces coupling between the regions. The entire
sector can now be viewed as one auction instead of several independent ones
as in the na¨ıve solution. Even if the number of hotspots in one region is small,
its hotspots are not guaranteed to win since the auction may buy more Wi-Fi
from other regions and save the cellular resource for this region, i.e., hotspots
compete not only within their regions, but also across regions. We now see a
new type of competition, which we call inter-region competition in addition to
intra-region competition.
Auction objective: The goal of the cellular service provider is to minimize
the total Wi-Fi and cellular cost, while satisfying the customers’ demands (i.e.,
ci +
∑
j:f(j)=i xj ≥ di) and offering appropriate incentives to the third-party
Wi-Fi hotspot owners to share their resources.
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5.2.2 Preparation: (Static) Global Allocation
We first ignore traffic variations and develop techniques to effectively
utilize both cellular and Wi-Fi resources in serving user traffic demands.
⊲ Input : di, ei, λj, pj, F (z)
⊲ Output : xj , ci, z
minimize:
∑
j pj ∗ xj + F (z)
subject to:
[C1]
∑
j:f(j)=i xj + ci = di ∀i = 1, 2, ...,m
[C2]
∑m
i=1 ci/ei = z
[C3] 0 ≤ xj ≤ λj ∀j = 1, 2, ..., n
[C4] 0 ≤ ci ∀i = 1, 2, ...,m
Figure 5.2: Problem formulation to optimize allocation
We formulate a global resource allocation problem as a linear program
in Figure 5.2. The formulation effectively captures global cellular resources
and local Wi-Fi resources by treating the cellular resource as a single resource
with a single bid. As shown, our goal is to minimize the sum of total Wi-Fi
cost (based on their bids) plus cellular cost F (z). The constraint [C1] ensures
that we have enough Wi-Fi and cellular resources to satisfy traffic demands
in each region i. The constraint [C2] relates the cellular capacity with the
cellular spectrum. The constraints [C3] and [C4] put upper and lower bounds
on xj and ci. Since there is no upper bound on z, there is always a feasible
solution. When z increases beyond the available spectrum, F (z) grows rapidly
to reflect high congestion cost. This problem can be solved efficiently using
linear program solvers, (e.g., CPLEX).
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5.2.3 iDEAL Dynamic Global Allocation
Traffic demand changes over time and is challenging to predict accu-
rately. Based on the history of observed demand vectors, we can optimize for
the representative demand vectors that are likely to occur in the next time
interval. Our goal is to find the allocation to minimize the worst-case cost for
these representative demand vectors.
Algorithm: Formally, suppose there are K historical demand vectors, de-
noted as Dk = (dk1, dk2, · · · , dkm) (k = 1, · · · , K), where dki denotes the k-th
possible demand in region i (i = 1, · · · , m). While it is difficult to predict ac-
curately the demand vector for the next time interval, it is common in robust
traffic engineering to assume that the demand vector for the next time inter-
val is covered by the convex hull of all the historical demand vectors Dk [71].
Under this assumption, we can minimize the worst-case cost while satisfying
all possible demands that may arise in the next time interval. We formulate
this dynamic global allocation problem by modifying the LP formulation in
Figure 5.2. In particular, we change [C1] and [C2] to the following:
[C1-dynamic]
∑
f(j)=i
xj + cki ≥ dki ∀ k and i
[C2-dynamic]
∑
i
(cki/ei) = z ∀ k
to ensure that we have enough cellular and Wi-Fi resources to satisfy all pos-
sible demand vectors. This is much more efficient than provisioning for the
peak demand in each region.
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From now on, we will refer to our dynamic global allocation algorithm
as iDEAL, and the static global allocation algorithm as iDEAL (static).
Property: A nice property of this dynamic global allocation is that it ef-
fectively leverages the global cellular resource on demand to satisfy different
possible traffic demands. In particular, while the total cellular resource is
fixed, the amount of cellular resource used in each region can change accord-
ing to the real demand. When demand shifts from one region to another over
time, the same global cellular resource can be used, instead of provisioning
for the peak demand in each region. Therefore, global cellular resource has
a distinctive advantage over local Wi-Fi resources in satisfying time-varying
demand, which we explicitly leverage in our formulation.
5.2.4 iDEAL Pricing Solution
As discussed in section 5.1, we want the pricing scheme to be truthful
and efficient. Meanwhile, we want the pricing scheme to fully benefit from
the inter-region competition. For example, when hotspots in one region lower
their bids and oﬄoad more traffic, this would reduce the demand for third
party resources in other regions and cause hotspots in other regions to sell
less. To capture this unique interaction between intra-region and inter-region
competition, we cannot treat auctions in different regions as separate auctions
and compute pricing separately; instead we must consider them as a single
auction and explicitly incorporate inter-region competition into the payment
computation.
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The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves [82] auction is well-known. It is both truth-
ful and efficient. It pays a winner the opportunity cost that the presence of
the winner introduces on the other players. VCG has a major weakness –
its cost is generally high [9]. However, in our setting VCG is able to capture
the inter-region competition, which lowers the cost. Thus to preserve the nice
properties of VCG (i.e., truthfulness and efficiency) while achieving low cost,
we apply the VCG principle globally over the whole cellular sector and com-
pute the global opportunity cost to capture both inter-region and intra-region
competition.
Algorithm: We follow the general VCG principle and compute the global
opportunity cost as follows. Let V (D,N) denote the valuation consumed in the
optimal allocation. D is a demand matrix containing K demand vectors Dk =
{dk1, dk2, · · · , dkm} (k = 1, · · · , K), which specify possible demands in each
region. N is the set of bidders (including the cellular service provider). Given
the result of the allocation scheme, if we buy t capacity from winner b in region
r, the amount of money we pay to b will be V (D,N\{b})−V (D1, N\{b}) where
D1 is derived from D by setting dkr = max(0, dkr − t) for each k and N \ {b}
is the set of remaining bidders after removing bidder b. Thus, V (D1, N \ {b})
is the total value sold by other bidders under the current optimal allocation;
V (D,N \{b}) is the total valuation optimized after removing b. The difference
is the global opportunity cost b imposed on other bidders.
Next we use an example to show how global opportunity cost is com-
puted and how the inter-region competition can help reduce cost. Figure 5.3
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(a) Optimal allocation (b) Optimal allocation af-
ter removing the winning
hotspot
Figure 5.3: Global opportunity cost example.
shows two regions R1 and R2, each with 1 unit demand. R1 has 2 hotspots
with valuations 1 and 3, respectively. R2 has 1 hotspot with valuation 2. Each
hotspot has 1 unit resource. The cellular resource is 1 unit and is worth 1.5.
The optimal allocation is shown in Figure 5.3(a): 1 unit of Wi-Fi in region 1
with valuation 1 and 1 unit of cellular resource in region 2. To compute the
global opportunity cost for the Wi-Fi winner b, we remove b and compute the
optimal allocation without the winner as shown in Figure 5.3(b). The new al-
location should use all the cellular resource in region 1 and the Wi-Fi resource
with valuation 2 in region 2. The total valuation sold by other bidders is thus
1.5 + 2 = 3.5, while in the original allocation the number is 1.5. So the global
opportunity cost we pay to b is 3.5− 1.5 = 2. In comparison, with the same
allocation, if we apply VCG in each region separately, the local opportunity
cost is 3 since region 1 has only the Wi-Fi resource with valuation of 3 after
we remove b. This shows that global opportunity cost is lower since it effec-
tively takes into account resources across all regions. Note that this notion of
global opportunity cost and its computation work for both static and dynamic
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global allocations. The two versions only differ in the allocation as described
in Section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Properties: iDEAL inherits the following three important properties from
VCG: (i) bidders have incentives to be truthful, (ii) the outcome of the auction
is efficient, and (iii) the auction is individually rational meaning third-party
resource owners have incentives to participate in the auction. Formally, we
have the following three theorems.
Theorem 4. In iDEAL, truth-telling is an optimal strategy.
Proof. Pick arbitrary bidder b1 in region r1, let its valuation for unit capacity
(e.g. 1 bps) be v1. Suppose when b1 bids truthfully, it sells t1 amount of
capacity. Its utility is
U1 = (V (D,N \ {b1})− V (D
1, N \ {b1}))− v1 · t1,
i.e., the difference between the payment it receives and its valuation for the
amount it sells, where D1 is derived from D by setting dkr1 = max(0, dkr1 − t1)
for each snapshot k.
If b1 bids untruthfully and sells t2 amount of capacity, its utility is:
U2 = (V (D,N \ {b1})− V (D
2, N \ {b1}))− v1 · t2, where D
2 is derived from
D by setting dkr1 = max(0, dkr1 − t2) for each k.
In order to prove truth telling is an optimal strategy we need U1 ≥ U2.
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It is evident that:
U1− U2 = [v1 · t2 + V (D
2, N \ {b1})]−
[v1 · t1 + V (D
1, N \ {b1})].
Here the first term is the minimum total valuation needed when we buy t2 from
b1 and the second term is the total valuation used in the optimal allocation.
Since the second term is optimal, the first term cannot be smaller and thus
U1 ≥ U2.
Theorem 5. iDEAL is efficient, which means when bidders are rational, the
winners are the bidders whose valuation for their resources is the least.
Theorem 6. iDEAL is individually rational, i.e., bidders of the auction will
get non-negative utility, assuming a bidder does not bid lower than his valua-
tion.
Theorem 4 indicates that it is beneficial for a bidder to bid truthfully
regardless of other bidders’ strategies. Theorem 5 follows from the truthfulness
property and our allocation, which minimizes the total valuation assuming
everyone bids truthfully. Theorem 6 guarantees that winners will be paid no
less than their valuation.
While Theorem 6 is easy to see in normal settings, it is less straight-
forward with our dynamic allocation because in the dynamic allocation the
total amount of resource we buy is not fixed. Specifically, when computing
the opportunity cost, we remove a winner and compute a new allocation and
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use the bid(s) of the newly admitted winner(s) as the payment. While the
unit prices of the newly admitted bids are not lower than the winner’s, the
total amount of capacity we buy in the new allocation might reduce. This is
because the new allocation may buy more cellular resource, which can be used
everywhere and may reduce the need for Wi-Fi in all regions. That makes
it hard to tell if the opportunity cost is higher than the winner’s valuation.
We prove the theorem using contradiction: if we remove a winner w and the
amount of increased valuation we buy from others (i.e., the opportunity cost)
is less than what w sells, then w should not have won.
5.3 Understand and Guard Against Collusion
In this section, we first identify potential collusion strategies in iDEAL
and show how they differ from those in normal VCG settings. We then discuss
how to mitigate such strategies. We call a set of hotspots colluding together as
a bidding ring. A bidding ring colludes by adopting a certain bidding strategy
to maximize utility, i.e., the difference between the payment and the true
valuation of the resource sold.
5.3.1 Collusion Strategies
Due to the distributed nature of hotspot locations, collusion in our
context is quite different from collusion in normal settings, where the optimal
collusion strategy is to let one proxy bidder buy (or sell in an reverse auction)
for the whole bidding ring [10]. However, in our system each hotspot submits
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a separate bid. This forbids hotspots to collude optimally and thus may resort
to other collusion strategies identified below. In particular, we consider two
types of collusion: (i) single seller collusion, whose objective is to maximize the
total utility of all hotspots owned by this seller, and (ii) multi-seller collusion,
where each seller colludes with other sellers, but tries to solely maximize its
own utility.
In both types of collusion, a bidding ring can drive up the price and
increase its utility by Supply Reduction (i.e., drop losing bids or reduce the
capacity offered in winning bids, which is equivalent to bidding an extremely
high price for the capacity that is removed from bidding). Supply reduction can
drive up price because it increases the opportunity cost, which is determined
by the immediate losing bids.
5.3.2 Mitigating Collusion
We mitigate collusion as follows:
Bidding as a group to address single-seller collusion: A single seller
with multiple hotspots has an incentive to reduce supply because its hotspots
submit separate bids. The opportunity cost of one hotspot can be affected by
the price/availability of its other hotspots. So by strategically dropping some
of its hotspots or raising their prices, it can increase its revenue. This strategy
is especially harmful as it may also increase the opportunity cost of other
sellers’ hotspots. Ultimately, it incurs a higher cost to the service provider.
To address the issue, we let the hotspots owned by the same entity bid
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as a group, i.e., the seller who owns multiple hotspots discloses all its hotspots
and we consider them as a single bidder in the auction. The seller has an
incentive to choose this option, since bidding truthfully is an optimal strat-
egy (Theorem 1). It is also preferred from the service provider’s perspective
because it only removes competition within the group. The hotspots in this
group still compete with hotspots of other sellers, which helps to bring down
the cost.
Dynamic demands in multi-seller collusion: In order to benefit from
supply reduction, a bidding ring needs to accurately predict which bids may
lose and drop them. Without that, supply reduction can cause harm by let-
ting the bidding ring miss opportunities to win. Making such predictions is
challenging due to the dynamic nature of the traffic demand and Wi-Fi avail-
ability. Therefore, in practice supply reduction does not necessarily increase
the utility of the hotspots, which can discourage them from colluding.
Stability of multi-seller collusion: When multiple parties are involved
in collusion, a natural question is whether the collusion is stable (i.e., all
members of the bidding ring have incentives to stay in the ring [10, 17]).
[10] shows that in normal settings, collusion in VCG is stable under certain
assumptions. However, their conclusion does not apply to our context because
of the difference in collusion strategies. Specifically, we make the following two
observations.
First, without utility sharing, members of a bidding ring have an in-
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centive to leave the ring (i.e., do not conduct supply reduction). Formally, we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Without utility sharing, for bidding ring members no supply re-
duction is a (weakly) dominant strategy (i.e., no worse than supply reduction).
This follows from the truthfulness of VCG and the fact that different
sellers submit separate, sealed bids and cannot pose as one entity in our system.
Second, the condition of “no utility sharing” is likely to hold in practice
due to difficulties of estimating utility obtained from collusion in our system.
One reason is that traffic demands and Wi-Fi availabilities are highly dynamic,
which makes it hard to attribute utility changes to collusion. Moreover, using
sealed bids makes it hard to validate the behavior of other members in the
bidding ring. We can make it even harder through system design such as
delayed payment (e.g., paying the hotspots every week even though the auction
is conducted hourly), which further obfuscates the utility.
5.4 Practical Considerations
Allowing general bidding curves: Section 5.2 assumes the cellular cost
F (z) is convex, and hotspot owners can bid only one price value pj for the
entire capacity they offer and are willing to sell part of the capacity at a pro-
rated amount. Now we consider more general cost functions, including convex,
concave (capturing economy of scale), or a combination. For example, a third-
party hotspot owner may want the flexibility of specifying an entire bidding
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curve characterizing the ask price with respect to the amount of oﬄoaded
traffic. The formulation shown in Figure 5.2 remains the same, except that
the optimization is no longer a linear program or convex program due to the
more flexible pj and F (z).
When only F (z) is non-convex and hotspot owners still bid only one
price value for the entire capacity they offer, the problem is easy to solve. We
approximate F (z) as a piecewise linear function and solve the optimization
problem by enumerating all possible line segments that z belongs to (because
within each segment F (z) is still a linear function). Essentially we solve a
linear programming problem for each possible line segment, and then pick the
best result from all the corresponding linear programs.
To support general Wi-Fi hotspot cost functions, we use dynamic pro-
gramming. We introduce discrete step sizes s and s′ that quantify the smallest
cellular and Wi-Fi capacity unit to purchase, respectively. Small step sizes give
better solution but increases running time. We build a table T , where each
entry T (k, z) gives the cost of satisfying the demands of the first k regions:
1, 2, ..., k using cellular capacity equal to z.
T (k, z) = min
v
{T (k − 1, z − v) + F (z)− F (z − v)
+ auctionCost(k, dk − v · ek)},
where auctionCost(k, x) is the minimum cost for satisfying x amount of de-
mand using Wi-Fi in region k, dk is the demand in region k, ek is the spectral
efficiency in region k, both z and v are multiples of step size s.
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We compute auctionCost using Dynamic Programming as follows:
Wk(i, y) = min
u
{Wk(i− 1, y − u) + cost(i, u)},
Wk is the Wi-Fi cost table for region k. Here i = 1, 2, ...Nk where Nk is the
number of bidders in region k. The amount of capacity we seek to satisfy, y,
varies from 0 to x, where x is the total amount of capacity we want to satisfy
with Wi-Fi in region k. cost(i, u) is simply the cost of satisfying u amount
of demand using only bidder i at his bid price. The expression indicates the
cost of using i hotspots to satisfy y demand in region k is the minimum cost
of using i − 1 hotspots to satisfy y − u demand plus the cost of using i-th
hotspot to serve u demand. y and u are multiples of step size s′. We then
have auctionCost(k, x) = Wk(Nk, x).
Supporting oﬄoading to femtocells and dynamic roaming: In addi-
tion to third-party Wi-Fi hotspots, femtocells and other cellular networks can
also be used for oﬄoading. Roaming to other cellular networks considered
here is different from traditional roaming. Traditional roaming is enabled only
outside the current cellular provider’s coverage area whereas dynamic roaming
in our context can take place within the coverage area to reduce congestion. In
order to support oﬄoading to different types of technologies, we need to effec-
tively handle partially overlapping spatial coverage, as different resources have
different coverage ranges. This requires changes to the allocation algorithm.
We extend our approach to support these scenarios by dividing overlapping
regions into multiple non-overlapping regions and allowing one provider to be-
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long to multiple regions. The constraint [C1] in Figure 5.2 is then replaced by
the following two new constraints:
∑
j:i∈f(j)
xji + ci = di, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., m,∑
i
xji = xj , ∀j = 1, 2, ..., n,
where xji is the amount of capacity bought from seller j and used in region i.
This extension can not only support oﬄoading to different types of networks,
but also allow a hotspot provider to use its resources across different regions
(e.g., hotspots belonging to a single restaurant chain spread across different
regions but sharing the same bottleneck capacity).
Incorporating quality score: The cellular service provider may prefer
some hotspots over others due to different quality (e.g., to avoid hotspots that
do not guarantee the amount of capacity they offer). In this case, we can
differentiate which hotspots to use based on the quality score qi (0 < qi ≤ 1)
of hotspot i. The higher the score, the better the quality and the easier the
hotspot can win in future auctions. To achieve that and ensure the auction
is still truthful and individually rational, we change the objective function in
the allocation phase to
∑
j(xj · pj/qj) + F (z), which essentially increases the
bid of hotspots with low quality scores and makes it harder for them to win.
We also change the payment for winner j to qj times the opportunity cost so
that individual rationality is still preserved because the opportunity cost is no
less than xj · pj/qj . It is not difficult to see that the auction is still truthful,
since the quality scores are bid-independent.
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Benefiting from delay-tolerant demands: Some application traffic (e.g.,
emails) is delay tolerant. A natural way to take advantage of such traffic is to
delay them when it is too costly to satisfy them immediately (e.g., when the
current traffic load is very heavy or when most traffic demands originate from
outside the Wi-Fi coverage areas and have to be satisfied by only the cellular
network).
Our framework is flexible enough to support this new optimization task.
Consider traffic demands in m snapshots, namely D = {dk,i, d2,i, ..., dk,i...}.
We can optionally delay a certain demand in snapshot i to snapshot j, where
i < j. The resulting demand (called final demand) becomes D′ = {d1 −
δ1, d2 − δ2 + δ1,2, ..., di − δi +
∑
j<i δj,i, ..., dk +
∑
j<m δj,m}, where δi denotes
the total amount of traffic in snapshot i delayed to future snapshots and δi,j
denotes the amount of traffic in snapshot i delayed to snapshot j. It is easy
to see δi =
∑
j>i δi,j. Our goal is to satisfy D
′ during every interval i while
minimizing the total cost of satisfying the demands over all intervals plus
the penalty incurred in delaying traffic. This can be formulated as an LP
problem shown in Figure 5.4. The variables are defined in Table 5.1 except
that now some variables have the additional subscript k to denote their values
in snapshot k. The objective reflects the cost of satisfying the final traffic
demand in all snapshots plus the penalty associated with delaying traffic. [C1]
enforces that the final traffic demand is satisfied during every snapshot. [C2]
captures total cellular spectrum usage in snapshot k. [C3] and [C4] provide
bounds on xk,j and ck,i. This extension changes the allocation algorithm in
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iDEAL, but the same pricing algorithms and proofs in Section 5.2.4 still apply.
⊲ Input : dk,i, ei, λk,j, pk,j, F (z)
⊲ Output : xk,j, ck,i, zk, δi, δj,i
minimize:
∑
k(
∑
j pk,jxk,j + F (zk)) + penalty
∑
k>j(k − j)δj,k
subject to:
[C1]
∑
j:f(j)=i
xk,j + ck,i = dk,i − δk,i +
∑
j<k
δj,k,i ∀k, i
[C2]
∑
i ck,i/ei = zk ∀k, i
[C3] 0 ≤ xk,j ≤ λk,j ∀k, j
[C4] 0 ≤ ck,i ∀k, i
Figure 5.4: Modified problem formulation to optimize allocation.
Selecting users to oﬄoad: So far, we have considered how much capacity to
buy from each Wi-Fi hotspot. Now we study which users should be oﬄoaded to
a particular Wi-Fi hotspot. We prefer a scheme that minimizes the switching
time (e.g., avoid oﬄoading users who will soon leave the hotspot or have little
traffic to send), while fully utilizing the purchased capacity at the hotspot.
We analyze the Wi-Fi traces from the large cellular provider in US, which also
provides Wi-Fi services, and find that a user who has stayed at a hotspot for
a longer time in the past is more likely to stay longer in the future. Therefore,
we propose a simple heuristic, which is to oﬄoad a user to the hotspot if (i)
the user has already stayed there for at least a threshold amount of time (e.g.,
5 seconds), and (ii) his estimated traffic demand is lower than the residual
purchased capacity at the hotspot. The condition (ii) tries to avoid switching
the user back and forth between the Wi-Fi hotspot and the cellular network.
Thus, users who are likely to soon leave the hotspot do not have to incur the
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Wi-Fi switching overhead.
Supporting unsplittable demand: A single device usually can only con-
nect to one hotspot at a time. To capture such unsplittable demand, we add
the following constraint to the formulation in Figure 5.2: the demand of each
device has an indicator tkj , where tkj = 1 when demand bk is assigned to
hotspot j and 0 otherwise. Therefore, for each demand bk,
∑
j tkj ≤ 1. For
each hotspot j,
∑
k bk × tkj ≤ xj . To solve this integer programming, we can
first relax integer constraint on tkj and solve the relaxed LP. Then we round
tkj to 0 or 1. Similar rounding approach has been successfully used to find an
approximate solution to several integer programming problems (e.g., [74]).
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Chapter 6
iDEAL Evaluation
6.1 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluate our approach using trace-driven simulations. We first de-
scribe the traces and how they are used.
Traces: We use the following traces: (i) Locations of cell towers and femto-
cells from a large cellular provider in the US, and hotspot locations from [86].
(ii) Detailed network data with periodic (every 2 seconds) reports of which sec-
tors mobile devices are using for their data communication. We use one-week
data from 2011, and pick the busiest sectors out of thousands of sectors. We
then use this data to estimate the number of users in a sector during one hour,
and the amount of time they stay in that sector. (iii) 3G HTTP traces re-
port detailed HTTP session information, such as HTTP duration, downloaded
bytes and type of the download during all 24 hours on a single day in 2011.
This is aggregated over several sectors and does not have information about
which sector the user currently is in. (iv) The backhaul capacity of about 150
hotspots from a large service provider in the US.
Generating regions: We generate regions by clustering the Wi-Fi hotspots
using k-means [51]. We use 6 regions as it minimizes partition index [15], which
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is a desirable clustering goal. We run the clustering algorithm 100 times and
pick the clustering that minimizes the average distance of Wi-Fi hotspots to
the centers of their assigned regions.
Network configuration: Based on the typical cell tower spacing of 400-
500m in busy urban areas, we use 250m as the communication range for a cell
sector. The communication ranges for Wi-Fi and femtocell are set to 100 m
and 40 m [8], respectively. To calculate spectrum efficiency, we use the distance
between the centroid of the region and the cell tower, and the distance between
the centroid of the region and the interfering cell towers, and compute path loss
using Hata model [33]. We consider 6 nearest base-stations as interfering base-
stations to calculate the SINR. We account for self-interference and compute
the resulting SINR′ as: SINR′ = SINR
1+α∗SINR
where SINR′ and SINR denote
the signal to interference and noise ratios with and without self interference,
respectively, and α = 0.005 [4]. We get the spectrum efficiency by applying
Shannon’s Law. Since the Shannon capacity is an over-estimate of the real
capacity, we scale down the result to match the maximum efficiency that is
generally observed in a cellular network (2 bps/Hz).
Generating traffic demands: To generate the demand for an hour, we
determine the number of users from the detailed network data during that
hour, and pick all the HTTP requests of the corresponding number of users
picked from the 3G HTTP trace. We replace the data rate in the trace with
the desired demand rate according to the application types: video 350 kbps,
audio 128 kbps, application (e.g., download binary files) 350 kbps, text 150
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kbps, and image 165 kbps. We determine the rates of applications, text, and
images according to the 90-th percentile rate that users receive from the 3G
HTTP trace, and determine the video and audio rates using the data from a
large service provider. The data rates in the traces are not used since they are
limited by the current cellular capacity and may not indicate the real demand.
We place users randomly in the sector and assign them to regions ac-
cording to their locations. When a single demand vector is used, we use the
peak demand from each region as the final traffic demand. When dynamic al-
location is used, we use all the demand vectors corresponding to the time when
any region has peak demand. This way, both static and dynamic allocation
schemes can sustain the peak loads in all regions.
Generating bids: We use the distribution of backhaul data-rates and pick
the available data rate uniformly as being 25%-75% of the backhaul data-
rate. The Wi-Fi bids are then generated based on the pricing plan of a major
service provider. We uniformly choose 50%-150% of the price as a hotspot’s
valuation for a given backhaul capacity to capture varying costs from different
service providers. We then determine the hourly Wi-Fi valuations according
to its capacity and monthly bills assuming 30 days/month and 8 hours/day.
The real bids depend on their bidding strategies and may differ from their
valuations. The cellular bid F (z) is set to 0 (reflecting the sunk costs) when
z is below 80% of cellular capacity (which is set to 3 carriers i.e., 3 times 3.84
MHz), and set to c times estimated maximum Wi-Fi valuation when z exceeds
80%. We set c to 1.25 by default and vary it, to evaluate its impact.
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Performance metrics: We compare different schemes using efficiency and
cost. Efficiency is measured as the total valuation of all resources consumed,
whereas cost is the total price of cellular and Wi-Fi resources the service
provider pays.
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Figure 6.1: Total cost comparison with truthful bids
6.2 Evaluation Results
6.2.1 Comparison of Truthful Auctions
We first compare the cost incurred under different auction schemes,
including iDEAL, iDEAL (static), per region VCG with global allocation, and
per region VCG with local allocation. All the auctions are truthful except per
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region VCG with global allocation, which is included to show how VCG will
perform without inter-region competition. In addition, we also compare with
fixed pricing, where the service provider pays the hotspots a fixed price and
uses the global allocation to determine which hotspots to buy. A hotspot with
higher valuation than the fixed price would not sell in this case, so we use the
maximum Wi-Fi price we may generate as the fixed price. The result of using
average Wi-Fi price as the fixed price is similar and omitted for brevity.
Figure 6.1 shows the cost incurred under different schemes. We first
observe that auction based approaches work much better than the fixed pric-
ing when there is enough competition. When the number of hotspots is small,
fixed pricing can perform better than most auction based approaches. How-
ever, iDEAL achieves lower cost than the fixed pricing even when the number
of hotspots is 40. With 130 hotspots, iDEAL is almost an order of magnitude
better than the fixed pricing. Second, iDEAL out-performs iDEAL (static),
which out-performs both versions of per region VCG. Per region VCG fails to
capture the inter-region competition and thus may suffer from limited com-
petition and lead to high cost. In comparison, both versions of iDEAL fully
benefit from inter-region competition. iDEAL further reduces cost by leverag-
ing the flexibility of using cellular resource in different regions on demand, thus
reducing the demands for third party resources. Therefore, iDEAL and iDEAL
(static) out-perform per region VCG by 63%-80% and 10%-61%, respectively.
We further compare the efficiency of the following allocations, all with
truthful bids: (i) iDEAL, which can optimize allocation according to multiple
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of total true valuation consumed.
possible demands, (ii) iDEAL (static), which optimizes allocation according to
a single traffic demand, (iii) local allocation, which statically allocates cellular
resources to different regions based on the traffic demands in these regions.
Note here we omit the fixed pricing because it is not an auction and it makes
allocation decisions solely based on the fixed price instead of the valuation.
Figure 6.2 shows the total true valuation of different allocation schemes as we
scale the traffic demands by a constant factor from 0.8 to 1.6 and vary the
total number of hotspots participating in the auction. As before, iDEAL out-
performs its static counterpart, iDEAL (static), which further out-performs
the local allocation. iDEAL reduces the total valuation to only 8%-42% of
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local allocation since it can effectively adapt the cellular allocation to different
regions based on real demand. Even iDEAL (static) performs very well: its
total valuation consumed is only 34%-72% of local allocation.
Figure 6.3 further compares the cost of different auction schemes as we
vary the cellular cost F (z) by changing its parameter c from 1 to 2, where
the cellular bid is set to c times estimated maximum Wi-Fi valuation when z
exceeds 80%. The absolute cost increases with c, as we would expect. The
relative performance across different schemes is similar for all values of c we
use. The total cost reduces as competition increases (i.e., when the number
of hotspots goes up from 40 to 130).
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Figure 6.3: Total cost comparison with varying cellular cost function
6.2.2 Comparison with Non-truthful Auctions
In this section, we study the impact of individual hotspot gaming in
non-truthful auctions. We compare iDEAL with the first price and regional
uniform price, both of which are widely used [21, 44]. The first price pays
winners the amount of their bids, and the regional uniform price pays all the
winners in a region at the first losing bid in the region. We do not compare with
76
GSP (Generalized second-price auction) because unlike GSP, iDEAL does not
differentiate between winning slots. If GSP were used, everyone would game
to be the highest paid winner as in the first price. We use the static global
allocation for all schemes, except that iDEAL uses dynamic global allocation.
There are many possible gaming strategies. In our evaluation, we consider sim-
ple gaming strategies as examples and show that even these simple strategies
can significantly degrade performance. In the first price, we assume a bidder
can observe some fraction of bids from other bidders in his region. We call this
fraction as Knowledge Factor (KF). He then uses that information to guide
his bid in the next round by bidding the maximum among (i) his valuation,
(ii) the average of the lowest losing price he sees, and (iii) the highest winning
price he sees (including his own bid in the last round). In the first round,
bidders start by bidding uniformly randomly between one time and two times
their valuation. In the uniform price auction, bidders can game by supply
reduction. So we let the winners who do not sell all their capacity reduce their
capacity to slightly below the amount they sell in the hope of admitting new
winners and potentially increasing the price. When they do sell all their capac-
ity, they will try to increase their offered capacity. In reality, bidders can be
more aggressive. For example, all bidders may attempt to reduce supply (e.g.,
even when they sell all they offer, they can potentially still gain by supply
reduction), which may harm the system even further. We conduct multiple
runs, and show the results from one run since they are all similar.
Figure 6.4 (a) shows how gaming affects efficiency. We make a few
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Figure 6.4: Cost of gaming
observations. First, both versions of iDEAL consume less total valuation. The
total valuation of iDEAL is as low as 8% of the first price due to more effective
use of cellular resources in presence of multiple demands. The total valuation
of iDEAL (static) is only 45% of the first price. Second, both versions of iDEAL
are stable as bidders are truthful. In comparison, the total value consumption
fluctuates considerably in the first price auction because the bidders adapt
their bids according to the others’ bids. The uniform price performs close
to iDEAL (static), because the bidders in our simulation only reduce supply
slightly and they do not game by asking higher. In reality, the damage can
only be worse.
Figure 6.4 (b) further compares the total cost to the provider. Similar
to the case of total valuation, both iDEAL versions yield significantly lower
cost. Specifically, iDEAL reduces the cost to 18% of the first price and regional
uniform price. Moreover, even iDEAL (static) reduces the total cost to 63%
of first price and regional uniform price. This result shows that with the help
of inter-region competition, using VCG does not incur higher cost than first
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Figure 6.6: Auction cost under collusion and with group option
6.2.3 Collusion
Collusion under dynamic demands: We first study how often a bidding
ring can improve its utility by supply reduction. We use two different sizes of
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the bidding rings: 20 and 50 out of 144 hotspots. For each size, we run the
experiment 10 times with different random sets of hotspots. Each run consists
of 50 rounds. In each round, the bidding ring drops all losing hotspots from
the previous round. If there is no losing hotspot, it brings back the cheapest
previously dropped hotspot. We vary the demand during each round, but
keep Wi-Fi bids constant. We confirm the degree of traffic variation in the
hourly traffic traces in multiple cellular sectors from a major cellular provider is
comparable to the traces used for our evaluation. Figure 6.5 plots the CDF of
percentage of utility change of the bidding ring due to collusion. We find that
for the bidding ring of size 50, collusion reduces the hotspots’ utility for 13% of
time and improves the utility for 28% of the time. For the bidding ring of size
20, the numbers are 20% and only 5%, respectively. When collusion reduces
utility, it reduces by 79% on average, while the number for improvement is
only 30%. These results suggest dynamic demand significantly reduces the
incentive to collude. In reality, when Wi-Fi bids are also dynamic, it is even
harder to predict which set of hotspots will lose.
Bidding as a group: Next we compare bidding as a group with collusion
using the same strategy mentioned above. Figure 6.6 plots the average cost as
we vary the total number of sellers and the total number of hotspots they own
and perform 100 random runs for each configuration, where each configuration
generates 10 sets of sellers and 10 sets of hotspots. The results are consistent
with our expectation: a single seller collusion does not always improve utility,
but it always incurs a higher cost to the service provider, especially when each
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seller has a large number of hotspots. In comparison, the group option, which
is preferred by sellers, reduces the total cost by as much as 36% and 96% when
the number of hotspots is 40 and 130, respectively. The damage of collusion
reduces as the number of sellers increases since increasing the number of sellers
means each seller controls fewer hotspots.
6.2.4 Extensions
Allowing bidding curves: If only F (z) is non-convex, we can approximate
F (z) using t linear segments and optimize allocation by solving t LPs, one
corresponding to each line segment. The running time increases by a factor of
t. When the Wi-Fi bids are non-convex functions, we need to use the dynamic
programming (DP) formulation in Section 5.4 to optimize allocation.
To quantify the computation cost and quality of DP solutions, we com-
pare them with those of the LP when the Wi-Fi bids are convex (since LP can
only handle convex functions). iDEAL static allocation is used in all cases. We
performed the computation on a 7 core Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.83 GHz CPU, with
32 GB RAM. Each result is an average of 5 runs. Figure 6.7(a) shows that
DP increases cost by 19.9-45.1% compared to the LP due to discretization. As
one would expect, smaller step sizes in the DP (defined in Section 5.4) yield
closer results to the LP. This is achieved at the cost of increasing running time.
As shown in Figure 6.7(b), step sizes of 50 KHz for cellular spectrum and 40
KBps for Wi-Fi capacity achieve close-to-optimal solution and take around 1
min for 130 bidders, which is affordable in practice.
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Figure 6.7: Performance of dynamic programming.
Supporting femtocell oﬄoad: In Figure 6.8 (a), we let bothWi-Fi hotspots
and femtocells participate in the auction. We vary the number of Wi-Fi bidders
while keeping 16 femtocells. As expected, the benefit of femtocells is larger
when we have fewer Wi-Fi hotspots. For example, the femtocells reduce the
cost by 32% when there are only 40 hotspots. As the number of hotspots
increases, the additional benefit from femtocells becomes marginal since Wi-
Fi has a higher communication range and is more effective in oﬄoading.
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Figure 6.8: Benefit of femtocell oﬄoading and roaming
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Supporting Dynamic Roaming: Figure 6.8 (b) shows the total cost as
the roaming capacity available varies from 0 to 4 Mbps, where 0 corresponds
to no roaming. The evaluation has 40 hotspots. In this case, since the Wi-
Fi resource is insufficient, even having 1 Mbps of available roaming capacity
(around 10% total cellular traffic in the sector) can significantly cut down cost.
Dynamic roaming reduces the cost to 17% of that when only Wi-Fi is used
with the low roaming price (which is set to the maximum winning Wi-Fi bid
we observe in the default settings), and 25% under the high roaming price
(which is the maximum Wi-Fi bid we may generate based on the distribution
we use). Further increasing roaming capacity leads to an even lower cost but
the improvement tapers off as the capacity increases beyond 2 Mbps.
Delaying delay-tolerant demands: We use two scenarios to demonstrate
the benefit of delaying some traffic demands. Figure 6.9(a) shows the the total
cost to serve both rounds under the first scenario, where we pick the highest
demand of all the hours as the demand in the first round and use the average
demand in an hour in the second round. We vary the penalty factor from 0
to infinity, where infinity means no demand will be delayed. We find delaying
some demands to the second round is beneficial in all cases when penalty is
smaller than infinity. The benefit is largest when the resource we have is not
sufficient for the first round but sufficient for the second round. As the figure
shows, the savings are 63.6% and 72.6% for 70 and 100 hotspots, respectively,
when penalty factor is 10. The corresponding numbers are 51.4% and 61.2%
when the penalty factor is 20.
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In Figure 6.9(b), we consider the scenario where in the first round many
users are not in Wi-Fi coverage and we vary the fraction of such users. In this
evaluation, we only use hotspots from 3 regions and leave the other 3 regions
not covered by Wi-Fi. In the second round the users are placed uniformly
across the sector. The results show that delaying some demands in this case
yields significant saving. When 100% of the users are not in Wi-Fi coverage
in the first round, the saving can be up to 24% under penalty factor 10, and
14.8% under penalty factor 20. When 40% of the users are outside Wi-Fi
coverage, the numbers become 20.2% and 12.2%, respectively.
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Figure 6.9: Benefit of delay tolerant demand.
Selecting users to oﬄoad: We use one hour of the HTTP trace in one
region, and determine the total Wi-Fi capacity to buy using iDEAL. We vary
the Wi-Fi switching time from 0.5 seconds to 4 seconds. Figure 6.10 plots the
ratio of total switching time and total oﬄoaded time as we vary the threshold
duration we use to oﬄoad a user to Wi-Fi (e.g., the user has to stay at the
Wi-Fi hotspot for a period that is over the threshold time). In all cases, we
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ensure the Wi-Fi capacity that was purchased is fully utilized since most of
the traffic come from the users who stayed at Wi-Fi much longer than the
threshold time. As we can see, picking users who stay at Wi-Fi hotspot longer
reduces the fraction of time spent in switching from 25.1% to 15.9% when
using 4 second switching time and 5 second duration threshold.
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Figure 6.10: Strategically selecting users to oﬄoad reduces the switching cost.
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Chapter 7
iDEAL Implementation
We describe how to oﬄoad in state-of-the-art commercial systems, and
then present our implementation.
Oﬄoading involves the following three issues: (i) identifying a network
to oﬄoad, (ii) automatic authentication, and (iii) seamless oﬄoad so that the
existing sessions are maintained during the oﬄoad. iDEAL already solves the
first issue. Here, we describe the other two issues.
Automatic authentication: 3GPP Release 7 uses the Extensible Authen-
tication Protocol (EAP) for key distribution to WLANs that are owned by the
cellular service provider. Hotspot 2.0 is developed to support authentication
with externally owned hotspots. Specifically, Hotspot 2.0 uses 802.11u to sup-
port the Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP), which is a query-response
protocol used by a mobile device to discover information including hotspot
owner’s domain name, roaming partners accessible via the hotspot, and EAP
method used for authentication and IP address type availability [2, 3]. To
support dynamic oﬄoading in this paper, the roaming partners are updated
dynamically according to the oﬄoading decision of our algorithm.
Seamless mobility: There are several strategies to perform data oﬄoading.
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The simplest strategy is to use an application based switch, which simply
moves a connection between cellular and Wi-Fi networks but does not worry
about preserving the sessions across the switchover. It can cause a disruption
to most applications and result in negative user experience, especially for VoIP,
VPN applications, and video streaming applications [1].
3GPP Release 8 uses Dual Stack Mobile IP (DSMIP) to enable seamless
handover between 3G and Wi-Fi. The solution does not require any support
fromWi-Fi hotspots. The cellular radio access network supports a Home Agent
(HA) that binds the new IP address of the node to the permanent IP. Since
the IP address is preserved in this case, it provides a better user experience
compared to application based switching [1]. Moreover, 3GPP release 10 uses
DSMIPv6, which allows mapping multiple IP addresses to a single permanent
IP address and supporting simultaneous use of Wi-Fi and 3G according to
application QoS requirements (e.g., keeping VoIP application on 3G and using
Wi-Fi for bandwidth intensive applications like video streaming). [46] uses an
implementation to quantify the efficiency of DSMIPv6 for managing handoffs
between networks. It reports a 0.02 sec interruption and 3 lost packets when
switching between IPv6 to IPv6 connection using 2 interfaces and 0.09 sec
interruption and 17 lost packets while switching between IPv4 to IPv6 network.
Further optimizations are possible to reduce the switching delay and packet
losses. For example, [73] shows packet loss can be reduced to near zero with
buffering on the mobile nodes.
Our implementation: We develop a prototype implementation on Linux
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Figure 7.1: System Architecture.
machines using a NetGear WAG511 NIC to demonstrate the feasibility of
our solution. Figure 7.1 shows our system architecture. Through a simple
web interface, hotspot owners can submit their bids to the service provider
machine, who controls the auction. Hotspots are configured using hostap [36].
Depending on who wins in the round, the service provider sends a message
to the hotspot with the ssid and password it should use in the current round
and also sends the ssid and password to the mobile client machine so that it
can connect to the winning hotspot. This message is sent using TCP sockets.
Authentication between mobile client and hotspot is done using WPA PSK
through WPA Supplicant [88].
We collected performance statistics from the mobile client for billing
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and keeping track of hotspot quality score. We measured the upload and
download statistics on the wireless interface using the Collectl tool [19] peri-
odically (e.g., every 10 secs) and send back the data to service provider PC
for bookkeeping. iDEAL allocation and pricing take 43 ms and 74 ms, respec-
tively, which are both small.
We further measure the association and authentication time in our
implementation. After getting the scan results, it takes 18 ms to associate,
103 ms to perform 4-way handshake (i.e., defining individual keys for unicast
transmission), and 3 ms to perform the group handshake (i.e., defining keys
for broadcast transmission). The authentication times can be further reduced
(e.g., using techniques in [41, 56]). Moreover scan times can be shortened by
selective scanning on fewer channels as proposed in [66]. Therefore, we can
achieve a very low overhead for handoff, making oﬄoading feasible.
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Chapter 8
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation via Double
Auctions
8.1 Background
A double auction implements a double-sided market. The market con-
sists of three types of entities: buyers, sellers and an auctioneer. Buyers submit
bids which specify the item they are interested in and their maximum willing-
ness to pay. Sellers submit asks which include the item they offer for sale and
their asking price. The auctioneer evaluates the bids and asks and determine
the winners and the items that are traded. The auctioneer also determines
the amount to pay to the sellers and the amount to charge the buyers. All
payments from buyers are paid to the auctioneer and the auctioneer pays the
sellers. A buyer’s utility is then the difference between his valuation of the
item he wins and the amount he pays the auctioneer. Similarly for sellers.
Figure 8.1 shows a spectrum double auction. Here the sellers are spec-
trum resource owners (e.g., cellular service providers or organizations that own
spectrum resource). The buyers can be any entities that need more spectrum.
To capture interference relationships among the buyers, measurement can be
conducted by the buyers, sellers, auctioneer, or a third party to derive the con-
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Figure 8.1: Double Auction: Spectrum Market
flict graph. We can leverage existing approaches to either actively or passively
measure the conflict graph (e.g., [62, 6, 75, 67, 94]).
After winning the auction, buyers then start using the new spectrum
by switching some of their clients onto the new spectrum. Techniques in intra-
cell handover (e.g., [31, 32]) and spectrum virtualization (e.g., [35, 78]) can be
applied to efficiently and seamlessly switch users to the new spectrum.
Basic auction settings: We consider a double-sided spectrum market where
the goods of interest are wireless channels (frequency bands) and the players
are spectrum resource users, such as cellular service providers. We assume a
seller offers one channel for sale and a buyer seeks to buy one channel as in
previous works [95, 91]. Multi-unit double spectrum auction is much more
challenging and we leave it for future work. A seller can sell to any buyer in
the market. We relax this requirement in Section 9.4. The auction runs peri-
odically to enable spectrum reallocation in a dynamic fashion. The frequency
of the auction depends on the volatility of demands and the cost of running
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an auction, which may include gathering inputs to the auction, computing the
auction solution, disseminating auction outputs, and collecting payments.
Critical value is the lowest value that a buyer can bid and still win.
Monotonic allocation means that a buyer that wins by bidding x will still win
if it bids y where y > x. The definitions are similar for the seller side.
8.2 Challenges in Spectrum Double Auction
Challenges in supporting spectrum reuse: Spectrum auction is funda-
mentally different from a conventional auction in that each item in a conven-
tional auction can only be used by one buyer whereas spectrum can be reused
by multiple buyers as long as they do not interfere with each other.
Wireless interference dictates how spectrum can be reused, so it has
significant impact on the design of spectrum auction. Conflict Graph [40] is
commonly used to capture the interference relationship between the buyers,
where each node in the conflict graph denotes a buyer and there is an edge
between two nodes if the corresponding buyers interfere.
Wireless interference has the following major impacts on the spectrum
auction. First, conventional auction design implicitly assumes all buyers com-
pete against each other globally. In comparison, to support frequency reuse
in spectrum auction, a buyer a only competes locally with the nearby buyers
that interfere with a. Second, a buyer’s competition is coupled with other
buyers’ competition depending on their interference. As an example, consider
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the conflict graph: a(7)− c(10)− b(5), where “− ” represents the interference
between two buyers and the numbers are the bids. In this example, buyer a
or buyer b individually does not outbid buyer c. However, since the buyers a
and b do not conflict and can share the channel, letting them win together is a
better choice than letting buyer c win alone. So a buyer’s auction outcome not
only depends on its competitors’ bids, but also depends on its collaborators’
bids, which further depends on its collaborators’ competitors’ bids and so on.
This significantly complicates the auction design.
Challenges in designing a truthful double auction: As mentioned in
Section 1, achieving truthfulness in double auction is very challenging. In par-
ticular, combining truthful seller side auction and truthful buyer side auction
does not necessarily lead to truthful double auction. We illustrate this using
the following example.
Consider the following buyer side design that tries to maximize effi-
ciency on the buyer side by maximizing the sum of winning buyers’ bids. This
allocation criteria is monotonic. It is a truthful single sided auction when it
uses critical value pricing. Suppose there are four buyers a, b, c and d, where
a, b and c do not conflict with each other and they all conflict with d. The
valuation of a, b and c is 3, and the valuation of d is 7. Assuming we have
1 channel to allocate, the winners are a, b and c because the sum of their
valuation is 9, which is greater than 7. The critical value for each winner is 1,
because one of the three nodes, say a, can win when it bids as low as 1 (as the
sum of a, b, c is still as high as d’s bid). So the total revenue is 3. However,
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it is possible that on the seller side, when one channel is sold, the selling price
is higher than 3, in which case budget balance is not satisfied and this trade
cannot happen. So no buyer gets a channel, and everyone has 0 utility.
Now a lies and lowers its bid to 1. a, b and c still win but the critical
values of b and c both become 3 and a’s critical value is 1 in order for the
sum of their critical values to still be as high as d’s bid. The total revenue
thus increases to 7. If this is higher than the price on the seller side, the
channel will be traded and a receives a positive utility of 3 − 1 = 2 (i.e., the
difference between its valuation and its payment). Thus the double auction is
not truthful since a’s utility increases when a lies about its valuation.
Weaknesses of existing solutions: There are a few previous works on this
topic. The pioneering and most representative work is TRUST [95], and several
variants have been proposed since then. Since they are similar to TRUST and
share the same strengths and weaknesses, we focus on TRUST.
TRUST follows the classic McAfee’s double auction design [54] to achieve
truthfulness. McAfee’s design is a single unit double auction. It first sorts sell-
ers in an increasing order of their asking prices and sorts buyers in a decreasing
order of their bids. Then it matches sellers to buyers from the two sorted list
by matching the first seller to the first buyer, the second seller to the sec-
ond buyer, and so on. It stops when all “profitable” matches are found, i.e.,
matches in which the asking price is lower than the bid. Finally, it sacrifices
the least profitable match. Sellers and buyers in all other profitable matches
trade. For pricing, it uses the asking price and the bid in the sacrificed trade
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as the price to pay to the winning sellers and the price to charge to winning
buyers, respectively. Because the sacrificed match is also profitable (i.e., its
asking price is lower than the bid), budget balance is satisfied when they are
used for pricing.
To use McAfee’s design, TRUST divides buyers into multiple indepen-
dent sets or groups, where the buyers in each independent set do not interfere
with each other. For each group, TRUST computes the group bid as the low-
est bid in the group multiplied by the group size. Then McAfee is applied by
treating each group as one virtual buyer. As in McAfee, all winning groups
pay the group bid of the group in the sacrificed match. Within the group all
members share the price equally. TRUST enables spectrum reuse by grouping
buyers and achieves truthfulness by applying McAfee’s design. However it has
the following weaknesses.
• Low efficiency: The independent sets are constructed in a random fashion.
It is possible that a high bidding buyer loses just because it is put into a bad
independent set. As a result, the final winning groups can be suboptimal.
• Low revenue: The group bid only depends on the lowest bid in the group
and all higher bids are ignored. So the group payment is significantly
limited by the lowest bid, which can be much lower than other bids in the
group.
• Unfairness: TRUST uses uniform price for the buyers that are assigned
the same channel. But buyers assigned the same channel may have differ-
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ent interference (competition) patterns. The uniform pricing forces some
winners to pay for other winners’ competition.
We illustrate the above weaknesses using the following example. The
conflict graph and bids are: a(60)− b(2)− c(30)− d(100). Assume two sellers
each offering one channel: channels 1 and 2, respectively. Let (a, c) and (b, d)
be the independent sets generated by TRUST. The group bid of (a, c) is 30×
2 = 60, while the group bid of (b, d) is 2× 2 = 4. Thus (a, c) is matched with
seller 1 and (b, d) is matched with seller 2. (b, d) is the last profitable match,
so only (a, c) wins. a and c together pay the group bid of (b, d), which is 4. So
a and c each pays 2.
In this example, because d is in the same group as b, his bid is ignored
although it is the highest. a and d winning together gives the highest efficiency
in this example. However, TRUST fails to consider that possibility due to the
group bid computation. TRUST also yields low revenue in this example since
it only uses the lowest bid, while the winning bidders can potentially pay
much more. TRUST is also unfair to d in this example, because he cannot
win regardless of how high he bids.
There have been several works on improving TRUST [89, 91]. Although
these works alleviate certain problems of TRUST, they are still similar in spirit
and still use random independent sets and enforce uniform price for buyers
assigned the same channel. So they still suffer from low efficiency and poor
fairness.
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Chapter 9
Our Solution: DA2
9.1 Overview
Design strategy: We develop a novel double auction for dynamic spectrum
allocation. It consists of the following three parts: (i) seller side auction design,
assuming N channels sell (ii) buyer side auction design, assuming N channels
sell, and (iii) a procedure to determine the number of channels N to sell to
satisfy budget balance.
To the best of our knowledge, our solution represents the first double
auction design for spectrum allocation that explicitly decouples the buyer side
and seller side auction design while achieving (i) truthfulness, (ii) individual
rationality, and (iii) budget balance. Previously, seller side and buyer side
auctions have to be designed jointly in order to satisfy all three properties and
(e.g., McAFee’s principle as used in TRUST all its variants).
Decoupling seller side and buyer side design is crucial for dynamic spec-
trum allocation for two reasons. First, using separate auction designs for the
buyers and sellers, we no longer require groups of buyers that share the same
channel to be formed in advance to match with sellers one by one. Instead we
can make more informed decisions based on the bids to select a stronger set
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of winners and improve efficiency, revenue, and utilization. Second, it enables
flexible combination of different buyer/seller side designs. This is especially
beneficial in our context since the two sides have rather different properties.
For example, it is commonly assumed that a seller can sell to any buyer in the
auction. Competition between sellers is similar to traditional auctions, whereas
the buyers’ competition is much more complicated due to complicated wireless
interference.
Proof strategy: The key to our ability to design two sides separately is a new
proof strategy for establishing truthfulness in a (decoupled) double auction.
Formally we have the following theorem:
Theorem 8. A double auction for dynamic spectrum allocation is truthful if
the following two conditions hold: (i) both seller side and buyer side auctions
are truthful when the number of channels that are sold, denoted as N , is fixed,
and (ii) no seller or buyer can improve its own utility by unilaterally modifying
its own bid and causing N to change.
The correctness of this theorem is easy to see: When a bidder lies but
does not change N , he cannot gain because both sides are truthful when N is
fixed. When a bidder lies and changes N , he can not gain either because no
seller or buyer can improve its own utility by unilaterally modifying its own
bid and causing N to change. Thus a bidder never gains by lying and the
auction is truthful.
We use the following theorem from [47] to assist our design:
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Theorem 9. If every losing bidder (i.e., unallocated) in an auction pays noth-
ing, it is truthful if and only if its allocation algorithm is monotonic and it
uses critical value as payment.
Design overview: Below is an overview of our design. The buyer side
auction is complicated since buyers’ competition is determined by the complex
conflict graph and buyers without interference can share a channel. This is
fundamentally different from traditional auctions. Therefore this paper focuses
on the buyer side auction design.
The seller side auction is a standard auction, since a seller can sell to
any buyer in the auction. Therefore we can apply uniform pricing or VCG for
single-unit auction. We prove it satisfies the properties specified in Theorem 8.
To determine the number of channels N , we start by setting N as the
total number of channels that sellers collectively have. We run seller and buyer
side auctions separately, and then check if budget balance is satisfied (i.e., the
payment collected from the buyers is no less than the payment to be paid
to the sellers). Note the payment is determined by our seller side and buyer
side auction design described below and not the sum of winning bids/asks. If
budget balance is already satisfied, we terminate. Otherwise, we decrease N
by 1, and run the auction again. By reducing N , it requires buyers to bid even
higher to win and sellers to ask even lower, thus reducing the gap between
revenue and payment. We stop when the budget balance is satisfied and N
channels are then traded. This procedure always terminates because budget
99
balance is satisfied when N drops to 0. Thus we guarantee budget balance,
which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Our design satisfies budget balance.
Note that McAfee’s design is a special case of our framework, where
both the buyer side design and the seller side design use uniform pricing. This
shows that our framework is general and under our framework it is possible
to design a double auction that satisfies all economic properties. Below we
describe our design in detail.
9.2 Seller side design
The seller side design is a standard auction since there is no need to
consider interference among sellers. Thus we simply use the traditional uni-
form price design. Assuming N channels are sold, the N sellers with the lowest
asking prices win, and they each get paid at the N +1-th seller’s asking price.
This uniform price design is known to be truthful in a single unit auction when
N is fixed. Moreover, since sellers are paid higher than their asking price, in-
dividual rationality is satisfied. We further prove theorem 11 to ensure this
design is truthful when applied to a double auction. See the Appendix for
proof.
Theorem 11. This seller side design, when applied to double auctions, does
not allow a seller to unilaterally manipulate N (i.e., the number of channels
that can be sold) and gain.
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9.3 Buyer side design
Overview: To ensure fairness and achieve high revenue, it is important for
the buyer side auction to explicitly take into account the fact that different
buyers face different levels of competition depending on their locations and
interference pattern. Existing approaches do not account for such individuality
and apply uniform pricing, where all buyers that share the same channel pay
the same amount. This is not only unfair, but also reduces revenue since a
buyer’s payment is limited by the lowest bids among the buyers that share the
channel.
Our key idea is thus divide-and-conquer. Specifically, we first parti-
tion the conflict graph into subgraphs. Independent sets are then constructed
within each subgraph and pricing is computed independently in each sub-
graph. We then design a merge strategy to combine the winners from different
subgraphs while preserving truthfulness. Note that when computing the allo-
cation within each individual subgraph, we ignore the inter-subgraph conflict
edges. During the merge procedure, we need to add back the inter-subgraph
conflict edges. As a result, some winners from individual subgraphs may have
to be removed due to the inter-subgraph conflict edges. The challenge is how
to do so without compromising truthfulness.
Benefit of graph partitioning: Note that while our partition idea is in-
spired by clustering structure in realistic conflict graphs, it also benefits general
graphs without explicit clustering structure. Before going to the details of our
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(a) Without partition (b) With partition
Figure 9.1: Benefit of graph partition
design, we first illustrate the benefits using an example shown in Figure 9.1.
It shows a conflict graph with 6 nodes a to f . We ignore the seller side in
this example and assume we want to allocate 1 channel. Partitioning has two
advantages: (i) better independent set construction, and (ii) higher revenue
due to the removal of the uniform pricing constraint.
We first illustrate the benefit (i). Assume the groups constructed by
TRUST are G1: (a, e, f) and G2: (b, c, d). The group bids of G1 and G2
are 20× 3 = 60 and 10× 3 = 30, respectively, which are the lowest bid times
the group size. So in TRUST G1 wins and pays the first losing group’s bid,
which is 30. The efficiency on the buyer side is the sum of all winning buyers’
bids, which is 20 + 20 + 30 = 70, and the revenue is 30. Now if we treat each
subgraph independently as shown in Figure 9.1(b): a, b and c win in their
subgraphs and they each need to pay the first losing buyer’s bid, which are 10,
20, and 30, respectively. Then we get the efficiency of 20 + 30 + 40 = 90 and
revenue of 10 + 20 + 30 = 60, both of which are much higher than TRUST.
102
To demonstrate the benefit (ii), we consider TRUST happens to con-
struct the same groups as ours, namely G1′: (a, b, c) and G2′: (d, e, f). The
group bids of G1′ and G2′ are 20×3 = 60 and 10×3 = 30, respectively. So G1′
wins, and pays the first losing group’s group bid, which is 30 and still lower
than the revenue in our scheme, because the revenue of TRUST is limited by
the uniform pricing (i.e., the lowest bid times the number of buyers). The
difference in revenue may have even bigger impact when we take the seller
side into consideration, because it affects the number of channels that can be
sold to maintain budget balance. Fewer channels can be sold if revenue is too
low, which in turn further reduces efficiency and revenue.
Essentially partitioning allows us to decouple nodes with no or weak
interference into different subgraphs so that we can improve the independent
set construction and avoid unnecessary coupling in different buyers’ pricing
even though they interfere with very different sets of nodes.
Design questions: Several important questions should be addressed in order
to realize the benefits of graph partition:
• How to partition the graph so that we can retain important interference
relationships within a subgraph and decouple nodes with weak and no
interference into different subgraphs?
• How to compute auction results within each partition?
• How to merge the auction results from different partition to achieve truth-
fulness and budget-balance?
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Below we answer each question in turn.
9.3.1 Graph partitioning
Given a graph A, a graph partitioning algorithm strives to find a par-
titioning A1, A2, ..., Ak that minimizes a certain objective. For the purpose
of dynamic spectrum allocation through double auctions, a good graph par-
titioning algorithm should balance two key requirements: (i) the number of
inter-subgraph edges should be small, and (ii) different subgraphs should be
similar in size. If a subgraph is too small (e.g., having only one buyer), a
small number of channels can satisfy all its buyers, leaving no losing buyers
and no revenue from the subgraph. On the other hand, a too big subgraph
may lead to poor independent set construction and poor performance due to
the uniform pricing in each group.
Two common alternative objectives have been proposed in the liter-
ature – RatioCut and Normalized cut (NCut). The former normalizes the
weights of the edges on the cut by the number of vertices in each parti-
tion, namely it minimizes
∑k
i=1
W (Ai,Ai)
|Ai|
, where W (Ai, Ai) represents the total
weight of all edges between Ai and the remaining nodes (i.e., Ai) and |Ai|
denotes the number of vertices in Ai. The latter normalizes the weights of
the edges on the cut by the sum of node degrees in each partition, namely it
minimizes
∑k
i=1
W (Ai,Ai)
vol(Ai)
, where vol(Ai) denotes the sum of degrees of all nodes
in the partition Ai. It is easy to see
1
|Ai|
and 1
vol(Ai)
are minimized when either
the number of vertices or the sum of node degrees within each partition is the
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same. This captures our goal of finding balanced cuts while minimizing the
weights of edges on the cut.
Minimizing either RatioCut or NCut is a NP-hard problem. Spectral
clustering is a well-known effective scheme to find approximate solutions to
this NP-hard problem (see [53] for a nice tutorial). There are many variants of
spectral clustering [53, 55, 60]. In this paper, we use the Meila-Shi algorithm
[55], which is the recommended algorithm in [53] due to its excellent perfor-
mance and solid mathematical foundation. Let W be the adjacency matrix,
with weight wij on its i-th row and j-th column. Let D be the degree matrix,
which is a diagonal matrix with the node degree di =
∑
j wij on the diagonal.
The Meila-Shi algorithm takes the eigenvectors corresponding to the k small-
est eigenvalues of the normalized graph Laplacian matrix Lrw = I − D
−1W
(where I is the identity matrix) and then invokes another algorithm (e.g., k-
means clustering [51]) to cluster points by their respective k components in
these eigenvectors.
To automatically determine the number of clusters to create (i.e., k),
we follow the suggestion of [53] and apply the eigengap heuristic. Specifically,
let λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · be the eigenvalues of the normalized graph Laplacian matrix
Lrw (sorted in an ascending order). The eigengap heuristic computes all the
eigengaps (i.e., difference between two successive eigenvalues) and chooses the
number of clusters k such that (λk+1 − λk) is the largest eigengap.
Note that when the conflict graph is disconnected, we first divide it
into multiple connected components since nodes in different connected com-
105
ponents have no competition at all. Then we apply spectral clustering to each
connected component to further partition the connected component.
9.3.2 Allocation within a subgraph
When a good partitioning is found, we first compute the allocation
in each subgraph independently. For that we can apply existing algorithms,
such as TRUST. To further improve the performance, in our implementation
we apply the allocation algorithm proposed in TDSA [91]. It is similar to
TRUST but it defines a new group bid and allows a subset of a group to win
while the rest lose. Consider a group k and assume its members are sorted in
a decreasing order of their bids. Denoting members as 1 to m, the group bid
is defined as max{bi × i|i = 1...m}.
The intuition of this group bid is that it quantifies the maximum po-
tential payment of a group, if we allow a subset of this group to win. For
each subset, the maximum potential payment is the lowest bid in the subset
times the size of the subset. Thus this group bid finds the highest potential
payment by enumerating all possible sizes of the subset. For example, if a
group contains bids (1, 3, 5), its potential payment could be either letting 5
win alone, which corresponds to payment of 5× 1 = 5; or letting 3 and 5 win
together, which yields a payment of 3×2 = 6; or letting all of them win, which
yields a payment of 1 × 3 = 3. The maximum payment achieved is 6 in this
example.
To allocate N channels, the groups with the top N group bids win.
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A winning group is then charged the first losing group’s group bid and all
members in the group share the price equally. If a member i cannot afford
its fair share, i.e., bi ∗ i is smaller than the first losing group bid, i does not
win and the price is shared among the remaining group members. Since the
winning group has a higher group bid than the losing group, there always
exists a subset of the group such that they can all afford their fair share. We
prove that this procedure finds the critical value of a buyer under our partition
and merge framework in Theorem 13 in the Appendix.
We also make a temporary assignment by sorting the channels in an
increasing order of their asking prices and assign the first channel to the first
group and second channel to the second group, and so on. However, this
assignment is subject to change in the merge procedure below.
9.3.3 Merge strategy
Next we describe how to merge allocation results from different sub-
graphs. We merge results from two subgraphs at a time. The input of merge
is the winners selected from the two subgraphs, including their channel as-
signment. The purpose of the merge is to find one way to reorder the channel
assignment in one subgraph such that winners on the cut do not have con-
flict. In case such reordering does not exist, certain nodes on the cut may be
dropped. We propose the following bid-independent merge strategy to select
a node to drop. We prove this merge strategy preserves truthfulness.
Figure 9.2 gives the pseudo-code of the merge procedure. In lines 1-4,
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1 for both A and B
2 Find all winning buyers on the cut
3 Merge buyers sharing the same channel into a virtual buyer
4 Put all winning buyers into Candidate
5 for each i in Candidate
6 Let degreei be number of i’s edges on the cut
7 flag = a feasible reordering function reorder(x) can be found,
where x is a channel currently used in B.
Note reoder(x) is only defined for channels that need to be replaced.
8 while flag is false
9 Sort Candidate in a decreasing order of degreei
10 Drop Candidate[0]
11 Update effective degrees
12 flag = a feasible reordering function reorder(x) can be found
13 for each winning buyer i in B
14 if reorder(assignB(i)) is defined
15 assignB(i) = reorder(assignB(i))
16 assignAB = assignA ∪ assignB
17 return assignAB
Figure 9.2: Pseudo code for bid-independent merge.
we preprocess the buyers on the cut by combining the buyers that share the
same channel on each side into one node to ensure buyers sharing the same
channel in one subgraph is always assigned the same channel no matter how the
assignment is reordered. Lines 5-6 compute the effective degree for each buyer
i, which denotes the number of i’s edges on the cut. This information is used
in lines 7-12 to determine which buyer to drop when a feasible reordering does
not exist. We drop buyers in a decreasing order of their effective degrees in
order to minimize efficiency and revenue loss. Every time a buyer is dropped,
the effective degrees of the remaining nodes are updated. We iterate until a
feasible reordering is found, and then use it to derive a joint assignment for the
union of A and B. Intuitively, our partition and merge framework preserves
truthfulness because both operations by themselves are bid-independent and
there is no incentive to lie. It is still possible to lie to change the allocation
in subgraphs, which changes the input of the merge operation, but a buyer
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cannot gain this way because of the use of critical value pricing. We formally
prove truthfulness in Theorem 12.
Figure 9.3: A simple example of the merge procedure
Figure 9.3 shows an example of merging two subgraphs. Let A and
B denote the left and right subgraphs, respectively, and c1 and c2 denote
the channels to be allocated. The labels next to nodes represent the channel
assignments to the nodes. Figure 9.3(a) shows the assignment to the winners
in each subgraph. If in one subgraph, some winning buyers on the cut share
the same channel, they should be merged to form a virtual buyer before we
proceed. There’s no such buyers in this simple example so we go to the next
step by adding back the removed edges. In Figure 9.3(b), the three previously
removed edges are added back and there is conflict between nodes 3 and 4 and
conflict between nodes 2 and 7. In Figure 9.3(c), the algorithm tries to reorder
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the assignment in B by swapping c1 and c2 but there is still conflict between
nodes 3 and 7. So in Figure 9.3(d) node 3, which is the node on the cut with
highest degree, is dropped to resolve the conflict.
Theorem 12. DA2 is truthful.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we first prove Theorems 13 and 14 in the Ap-
pendix, and then apply Theorems 8 and 11.
9.4 Incorporating seller locality
Motivation: So far our solution assumes a seller can sell to all buyers. In
reality, a seller may own channels in a limited area and cannot sell to all buyers.
This problem is considered in [84], but it requires each buyer-seller pair to be
budget balanced, which is a very strong requirement and can significantly limit
spectrum reuse because the new buyer may not be able to afford the entire cost
of a channel. An important advantage of a spectrum double auction is that
we can leverage payment from multiple buyers that reuse the same channel to
pay to a seller.
Challenges: A naive approach is to divide the global area into regions
where each region is covered by a few sellers and in each region sellers can sell
to all buyers in that region. Then our allocation can be applied to each region
independently, assuming each buyer only belongs to one region. However,
treating each region as an individual auction can prevent feasible trades and
limit spectrum reuse because the revenue in a single region may not be enough
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to satisfy the sellers’ price (i.e., budget balance is violated within one region),
while the revenue from multiple regions together may be sufficient to pay for
the sellers (i.e., budget balance is satisfied globally). Moreover, uniform pricing
for sellers may not be truthful since only the sellers whose coverage overlap
compete against each other. Different sellers face different competitions.
To address these challenges, we change the seller side design of the
auction to use Cross-region budget balance and Non-uniform seller side pricing.
In Cross-region budget balance, we allow a region that has sufficient revenue
to help other regions. We illustrate the idea using a simple example. Consider
a region with three sellers 1, 2 and 3, and sellers 2 and 3 are already budget
balanced in other regions (i.e., sellers 2 and 3 get enough payment from the
buyers in other regions). Then we do not need to consider budget balance
requirement for sellers 2 and 3 in this region, and this region is budget balanced
as long as the revenue is higher than the payment to seller 1. In this way, we
can allow more channels to be sold and achieve higher efficiency and spectrum
reuse. In Non-uniform seller side pricing, we compute the critical value of
winning sellers under our new allocation algorithm. We describe them in
detail below.
Cross-region budget balance: To generalize the intuition from the pre-
vious simple example, we design the scheme in Figure 9.4. At a high level, it
finds regions that are budget balanced and use them to lower the budget re-
quirement for the other regions that overlap with the budget-balanced regions.
As shown in Figure 9.4, lines 1-5 initialize all regions and all sellers to be not
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1 for each seller i
2 SellerBalancedi = 0
3 Losei = 0
4 for each region m
5 RegionBalancedm = 0
6 while not all regions are budget balanced
7 find seller j with the highest ask price aj
and SellerBalancedj = 0
8 Drop j by setting Losej = 1
9 for each region m where RegionBalancedm = 0
10 Compute allocation assuming all remaining sellers in m win
11 Compute buyer pricing and the total revenue R
12 Compute the total selling price:
S =
P
i∈m,SellerBalancedi=0
aj
13 if R ≥ S
14 RegionBalancedm = 1
15 for each seller i in m
16 SellerBalancedi=1
17 Allocation completes and all sellers with SellerBalancedi = 1 win.
Figure 9.4: Pseudo code for allocation with cross-region budget balance.
budget balanced, and all sellers are initially included in the auction. In lines
6-17, we drop the highest asking seller that is still not budget balanced until
all regions are budget balanced. Because the selling price is determined by
the losing sellers’ prices, dropping a seller lowers the selling price and makes
it easier to satisfy budget balance. Every time a seller is dropped, in lines
9-13 we compute allocation in each region that is still not budget balanced
and check if budget balance is satisfied with the new allocation, assuming any
seller that is not already budget balanced will be paid at the last dropped
seller’s asking price. For sellers that are already budget balanced, we consider
the payment as 0. In lines 14-17, if a region becomes budget balanced in this
round, we label all its sellers as budget balanced and we also label this region
as budget balanced. Finally, all the sellers that are budget balanced will win.
With cross-region budget balance, the point where budget balance is
satisfied is no longer characterized by a single N . Instead it is a vector of
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numbers Ni, where Ni the first losing seller’s position in region i.
Non-uniform seller side pricing: It is easy to see that the above allocation
is monotonic for sellers. Then in order to achieve truthfulness, we pay the
winning sellers their critical values. If a seller becomes budget balanced after
seller j is dropped, its critical value is the j’s asking price. Different sellers’
critical value may differ, which is desirable, since it captures their different
competition patterns. We prove that is indeed the critical value in Theorem 15
in the Appendix.
According to Theorem 9, we conclude that the seller side is truthful if
the budget balance point does not change. To show that the double auction
is truthful we require that no seller can change the budget balance point by
lying and gain. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 11 and omitted.
9.5 Practical Issues
Next we discuss practical issues involved in applying DA2.
Reputation score: The auctioneer maintains a reputation score ri (0 <
ri ≤ 1) for both buyers and sellers to reflect their quality. For a seller the
score can be based on his channel quality and for a buyer it can be based
on whether this buyer uses wireless resource carefully without causing extra
interference to other buyers. The higher the score, the better the reputation.
When computing the allocation, we divide every seller’s asking price by its
reputation score so that it is harder for a seller with bad reputation to win.
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We then multiply a seller’s reputation score to its critical value to compute its
final payment. Since the critical value is computed based on the reputation
weighted asking prices and is greater than a winner’s asking price divided by
its reputation, individual rationality is achieved. Similarly, for buyers we can
multiply their bids with their reputations when computing the allocation, and
then divide its critical value by its reputation score to get the real price they
need to pay to ensure individual rationality. Truthfulness is also preserved
as the reputation scores do not depend on bids. Moreover, budget balance is
still satisfied because we determine N based on the the real selling price and
payment (after multiplying/dividing the reputation scores).
Leveraging prior knowledge: The independent set construction is criti-
cal to the performance. Our solution mitigates the randomness but the con-
struction can be further improved if the auctioneer has prior knowledge, e.g.,
distributions of buyers’ valuations. Specifically, we can maximize the expected
valuations in winning groups, which directly relates to auction efficiency by
formulating the construction as a maximum weight independent set problem
(MWIS). The expected valuation of an independent set is simply the sum of
expected valuations of all the members. The MWIS problem on conflict graphs
can be approximated in polynomial time, e.g., [61]. When the error of prior
knowledge with respect to the actual bids is up to 10%, the efficiency improves
by 16% over our current scheme on average; and when the error increases to
up to 50%, the average improvement becomes 6%.
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Chapter 10
DA2 Evaluation
Simulation setup: In order to experiment with realistic conflict graphs,
we use the location data of cell towers from a large US service provider. We
consider there are buyers at each tower/location looking for spectrum resources
at that location and that they do not collude. We construct the conflict graph
for three cities: New York City (NYC), San Francisco (SF) and Chicago.
In each city, we pick a grid (approximately 5km by 5km) encompassing the
downtown area and use all the cell towers in the grid to generate the conflict
graphs. We consider that two nodes conflict if the inter-node distance is smaller
than 500m, which is considered a typical cell range. We also vary the range
to see how the network density impacts the performance. We only present
results with conflict graphs generated based on real locations but we also
experimented with random conflict graphs and observed similar benefits.
We use 5 sellers by default, and also vary the number from 3 to 7 to see
the impact. For the sellers’ asks and buyers’ bids, the absolute values do not
matter and only their ratio matters. We generate the buyers’ bids drawn from
a uniform distribution between 0 to 100. We also use a uniform distribution
to generate the asking prices. Since each grid can cover at most 25 buyers and
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we assume buyers and sellers value the sepctrum resource similarly such that
the price from the two sides compare fairly, we generate the asking prices to
be between 0 to 2500 such that the mean is 25 times of the mean of a buyer’s
bid. We also scale the sellers’ asking prices to see its impact in our evaluation.
We compare our scheme with TRUST and TDSA [91] in terms of the
following three metrics: (i) Efficiency: This is widely used to quantify auction
performance. It is defined as the difference between the sum of all winning
buyers’ bids and the sum of all winning sellers’ asks. (ii) Revenue: It is
defined as the total payment from all winning buyers. Since the payment uses
critical value, which is different from the bids, revenue is also different from
the efficiency on the buyer side. A higher revenue gives a stronger incentive
for sellers to participate. (iii) Utilization: This is defined as the number of
winning buyers. This is a unique metric in spectrum auctions because the
spectrum resource is precious but reusable, and a higher utilization means
more winners can utilize the spectrum at the same time, which is preferred.
For every setting, we run 20 times with different random asking prices and
bids, and report the average.
Performance at different locations: We first compare the performance
in all three cities. We find that the performance can differ significantly in
different cities. Specifically, SF gives the highest values in all three metrics
while Chicago gives the lowest and NYC lies in between. The performance
difference is primarily due to difference in the numbers of buyers. SF has 16%
more buyers than NYC, while the number of buyers in Chicago is only around
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Figure 10.1: Performance at different locations
half of that in NYC. In general, more buyers tend to generate higher revenue,
thus more channels can be traded. Among all the schemes, DA2 achieves
the best performance in all three metrics and for all three cities. It improves
efficiency to 22x to 62x of that of TRUST, revenue 27x to 126x, utilization 42x
to 65x. TRUST does not perform as well because it is limited by the uniform
pricing and the lowest bid in each group. As a result, its revenue is low and
only few channels can be sold. TDSA performs better than TRUST because
it searches for the best subset of a group to win and is thus more robust to
the lowest bid in a group. DA2 still outperforms TDSA by 51% to 101% in
efficiency, 57% to 115% in revenue, and 47% to 93% in utilization. This is
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Figure 10.2: Impact of the number of sellers
because DA2 (i) decouples pricing in different subgraphs to better capture
the competition, and (ii) combines the top groups from different subgraphs to
reduce randomness and find a set of winners with higher valuations.
In the remaining evaluation, we use the NYC conflict graph as default
and study the impact of other parameters.
Impact of the number of sellers: We now vary the number of sellers from
3 to 7. As shown in Figure 10.2, with an increasing number of sellers, more
channels become available and the price reduces due to increased seller-side
competition. As a result, more channels can be traded and all performance
metrics improve. DA2 consistently out-performs the existing approaches. Its
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improvement is highest when there are only 3 sellers, in which case they achieve
as much as 3x times the performance of TDSA in all three metrics. TRUST
does not sell a single channel in the 20 runs with 3 sellers because its revenue is
low and it is more challenging to sell a channel while ensuring budget balance
when the number of sellers is small. When the number of sellers increases to
7, DA2 out-performs TRUST by 27x in efficiency, 71x in revenue, and 23x in
utilization; and out-performs TDSA by 85% in efficiency, 97% in revenue, and
86% in utilization.
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Figure 10.3: Impact of network density
Impact of network density: Next we vary the network density by changing
the buyer communication range from 250m to 750m. A longer range indicates
119
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
0.5 0.8 1 1.2 1.5
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y
Scale of ask price
TRUST
TDSA
DA2
(a) Efficiency
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
0.5 0.8 1 1.2 1.5
R
ev
en
ue
Scale of ask price
TRUST
TDSA
DA2
(b) Revenue
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
0.5 0.8 1 1.2 1.5
Ut
iliz
at
io
n
Scale of ask price
TRUST
TDSA
DA2
(c) Utilization
Figure 10.4: Impact of bid distribution
more competition among buyers and fewer buyers can reuse a channel. As
shown in Figure 10.3, the benefit of our scheme increases with the range since
it is harder to sell a channel and a good auction design becomes even more
important. For example, when the range is 250m, our scheme out-performs
TDSA by 29% in efficiency, 55% in revenue and 30% in utilization. The
corresponding numbers for a range of 750m are 152%, 172% and 173%. The
performance trend in TRUST is less clear because TRUST heavily depends
on the random independent set construction. However, under all three ranges,
DA2 achieves 14x the efficiency, 22x the revenue, and 13x the utilization of
TRUST.
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Impact of bid distribution: To understand the impact of bid distribution,
we scale all the sellers’ asking prices by a factor between 0.5 to 1.5 after the
initial ask is drawn from the uniform distribution with values between 0 and
2500. This changes the ratios between sellers’ valuation and buyers’ valuation.
A lower asking price means budget balance is easier to achieve. A higher asking
price requires a higher revenue from the buyer side in order to sell the channels,
and is more challenging for an auction scheme. Figure 10.4 clearly shows that
trend. In all cases, DA2 outperforms the existing schemes. The benefit of
DA2 increases with the asking price. For example, when we scale the asking
price to 1.5 times, our approach out-performs TDSA by 3 times in all three
metrics. The improvement over TRUST is even larger, as TRUST does not
sell a channel in this case and all its metrics are 0.
Seller locality: To study localized sellers, we compare DA2 with the District
algorithm described in [84], which is specifically designed to incorporate seller
locality. For fair comparison, we compare with the solution in [84] that does
not require prior knowledge. In order to take seller locality into consideration,
it takes a conservative approach and requires every single seller-buyer pair to
be budget balanced, and then finds the assignment for buyers one by one.
We randomly generate three regions and also randomly assign buyers
to one of these regions with the same probability. District requires a pre-
selected parameter that specifies the maximum number of winning buyers,
and picks that many highest bid buyers and uses the bid of the first buyer
that is not selected as the amount to charge to the winning buyers. We vary
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Figure 10.5: Local sellers.
that parameter from 10 to 160.
Figure 10.5 summarizes the result. We make three observations: First,
our scheme is significantly better in all the experiments. For example, DA2
out-performs District by 2.5x to 12x in efficiency, 62% to 4.5x in revenue, and
4.5x to 20.5x in utilization. The main reason is that District requires each
seller-buyer pair to be budget balanced. This artificial restriction makes a
trade hard to take place. Our scheme not only benefits from considering all
the buyers from all regions, but also uses cross-region budget balance to allow
regions with higher revenue to help weaker regions, thus achieving much better
performance. Second, the pre-selected parameter (i.e., the maximum number
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of winning buyers in District) has significant impact on the performance of
District and the best parameter is difficult to determine. If the parameter is
too small, too few buyers get selected; if the parameter is too big, the payment
from winning buyers becomes too low and only few sellers have their budget
balance requirement satisfied as a result. In comparison, our scheme does not
require a pre-selected parameter. Third, compared with the default setting as
in the previous evaluation where a seller can sell to all buyers, the absolute
efficiency, revenue, and utilization are all lower. This is as what we would
expect since the sellers here only sell in a specific region, which may not cover
all buyers.
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Chapter 11
Related Work
Our work is related to the following research areas:
Social networks: The explosive growth of online social networks has at-
tracted significant attention [5, 11, 7, 57]. Previous studies (e.g., [49, 50, 79])
show that path-ensemble based proximity measures, such as Katz measure [42],
rooted PageRank [49, 50], and escape probability [79], are effective in predict-
ing links between users. [76] develops proximity embedding algorithm for
efficient and accurate proximity estimation in large social networks. It is ap-
plicable to all path-ensemble based proximity measures, so we use it in our
study.
Mobile social networks: The popularity of mobile social networks has
increased rapidly. [24] describes social serendipity to perform matchmaking in
mobile social networks. Loopt[52] is a mobile geo-location service that notifies
users of friends’ location and activities via detailed interactive maps. Both
schemes rely on a centralized server. Mobiclique[68] is a middleware that allows
mobile phone users to connect to others over ad-hoc networks to exchange
social network identity information and forward messages opportunistically.
It assumes all users are trusted, and ignores privacy and security.
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Privacy in online social networks: [12] applies attribute-based encryption
to provide fine-grained access control to the personal information. [80] pro-
poses a social attestation that certifies a social relationship between any two
parties. The recipient of a social attestation can use it to prove to a third party
(e.g., an online system) that (s)he has a certain relationship with the sender
and get access to the restricted content. These works are complementary to
our protocols. [28] develops a cryptographic private matching technique that
exploits friend-of-friend relationships to automatically generate whitelists for
email senders, and [27] proposes enhancement. Since set intersection is a spe-
cial case of dot product, our verifiable secure dot product protocol can be
applied to their context to provide stronger security guarantees.
Privacy in wireless networks: Wireless network privacy becomes an in-
creasing concern due to ease of eavesdropping. [65] shows that a number of
explicit identifiers in 802.11 MAC header can be used to identify and track
users. SlyFi [30] is an 802.11-like link layer protocol that obfuscates all trans-
mitted bits to remove explicit identifiers and increase privacy. [20] provides
flexible presence sharing between users with social relationships by broadcast-
ing clique signals. It provides presence sharing among strangers by letting
users broadcast opaque identifiers, which can be resolved to an identity at a
centralized trusted broker. This is related to our virtual ID, but we use vir-
tual ID as a public key to communicate directly with other users in the mobile
social network.
Privacy-preserving computation: There are two classes of privacy-preserving
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computation: encryption-based techniques and obfuscation-based techniques.
Encryption-based protocols like [29] are based on homomorphic encryption
and are computationally expensive. The obfuscation based schemes[38, 81]
are light weight but tend to leak some information. Privacy-preserving dot
product protocols are important in the area of distributed range query com-
puting and association mining [29, 38]. A unique feature of our approach is
that it is both privacy-preserving and verifiable.
Cellular oﬄoading: The need to complement cellular networks with other
forms of connectivity has been considered in the past. The authors in [13] con-
duct measurements in a vehicular testbed, and report that Wi-Fi is available
for only 11% of the time and 3G is available for 87% of the time. Moreover,
they find that 3G and Wi-Fi availability are negatively correlated, e.g., Wi-Fi
is available in 50% of the times that 3G is not available. Lee et al., in [48]
use daily mobility patterns of 100 iPhone users to measure the amount of data
Wi-Fi can oﬄoad. They find that Wi-Fi can oﬄoad 65% of data traffic with-
out any delay; if 1 hour or longer delay can be tolerated, the oﬄoad traffic
increases further by 29%. Zhuo et al., in [97] leverage VCG based auction
mechanism to incentivize mobile users to wait until they come in contact with
a Wi-Fi AP. Authors in [22] quantify city-wide WiFi oﬄoading gain. They
show that even a sparse Wi-Fi network improves performance. Different from
the above existing works, our paper focuses on how to incentivize third party
resource owners to oﬄoad cellular traffic. The work in [18] is closest to ours.
It proposes a VCG reverse auction framework to buy femtocell resources. As
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mentioned in Section 1, it does not address the three unique challenges we fo-
cus on, namely, diverse spatial coverage, traffic uncertainty, and collusion. The
scheme is similar to the local allocation in spirit in that it statically determines
the amount of third-party resource to buy for each region.
Spectrum auctions: There are a number of works on spectrum auc-
tions. [95] is the pioneering work that proposed using double sided spectrum
auctions. There have been several works on improving TRUST [89, 37, 91].
Although these works alleviate certain problems of TRUST, they are still sim-
ilar in spirit: they still use random independent sets and enforce uniform price
for buyers assigned the same channel. So they still suffer from low efficiency
and poor fairness. [89] improves on TRUST to sacrifice fewer buyers. How-
ever, it uses a single sided auction, a much simpler problem. [37] builds on
[89], but focuses on the privacy aspect instead of auction design. [91] pro-
poses a new definition of group bid which achieves better auction performance
and preserves all economic properties. So we also compare with [91] in our
evaluation.
There are also some spectrum double auction designs that are not based
on TRUST. However, many of them neglect the challenges in designing a truth-
ful double auction and the need to capture a complicated conflict graph. [83]
proposes an online double sided spectrum auction where buyers can come and
request for resource at different times. However, they assume a complete con-
flict graph (i.e., everyone interferes with everyone else), which simplifies the
competition pattern and disables spectrum reuse. [90] proposes a single unit
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double auction with discriminatory pricing, but their auction is not theoreti-
cally proven to be truthful. Some other works try to make double spectrum
auction possible in more realistic settings. [25] proposes a double auction simi-
lar to TRUST, but takes buyers’ frequency preference into consideration while
forming groups. This is complementary to our work. [84] focuses on incor-
porating market locality. Our design also supports this feature and achieves
much better performance as shown in Section 10. In addition, [39] proposes
a double auction based approach for mobile data oﬄoading, but it does not
consider wireless interference as in spectrum auctions.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
In this work we focus on designing effective and mathematically sound
approaches to facilitate collaborative mobile services. We first consider the
collaboration between end users in a distributed mobile service: friend dis-
covery in mobile social networks. This service requires two conflicting goals
in collaboration simultaneously, information sharing (verifiability) and infor-
mation protection (privacy). To address that challenge, we develop a secure
friend discovery protocol that achieves both privacy and verifiability. Then to
reduce the computation overhead we use a two phase protocol where in the
first phase a light weight protocol that only ensures privacy is used, and the
second phase is only triggered if the first phase is successful. Our protocols
are the first verifiable secure dot product protocols and our solution is widely
applicable to secure multiparty computations, privacy preserving data mining,
etc.
Second, we study a instance of cross level collaboration and propose
iDEAL to enable the cellular service provider to purchase and leverage third-
party resources on demand through reverse auctions. iDEAL uses a truthful
auction mechanism to incentivize true information sharing and avoid lying.
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iDEAL also mitigates potential collusion between third party resource owners.
Moreover iDEAL address several unique challenges in cellular oﬄoading, such
as diverse spatial coverage and dynamic traffic demands.
Finally we focus on collaboration at the service provider level. We pro-
pose DA2, a novel double auction mechanism for cellular service providers to
reallocation the spectrum resource in a dynamic fashsion. DA2 improves on
existing spectrum double auctions by adopting a new design approach that
separates the buyer side design and the seller side design. By leveraging the
clustered property of real world conflict graphs, DA2 allocates spectrum re-
source more efficiently and achieves higher efficiency and revenue in the auc-
tion. We also carefully design the partition-and-merge framework in DA2
such that all desired economic properties - truthfulness, budget balance and
individual rationality - are preserved.
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Proof of Theorem 11:
Proof. To change N by lying, a seller i needs to change the point where the
budget balance is satisfied, which requires the seller to change the total selling
price. Let S(N) be the total selling price when N channels sell and R(N) be
the total revenue. Let Ui(x,N) be the utility of seller i when it asks x and
N channels sell. Since the seller side design is truthful, we have Ui(vi, N) ≥
Ui(x,N), where vi is i’s true valuation and x can be any value.
We consider the following cases:
(1) i is a winning seller: i cannot change N as long as it still wins. If
it changes N and now loses, its utility does not improve.
(2) i is a losing seller:
(a) Lie by asking higher. Obviously, N cannot increase in this case,
since S(N) does not reduce for any N . i is a losing seller in the original case
so it is not within the top N . i cannot enter the top N by asking even higher.
(b) Lie by asking lower. We only consider the case when i becomes a
winner, because its utility is still 0 if it still loses. We then divide into the
following cases.
Case 1: N does not change: i’s utility cannot improve because Ui(vi, N) ≥
Ui(x,N).
Case 2: N reduces to M : i is not in the top M when it bids truthfully,
so Ui(vi,M) = 0. Thus i either receive 0 utility or negative utility because
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Ui(vi,M) ≥ Ui(x,M)
Case 3: N increases to M :
(i) i is in the top M when it bids truthfully, and the M + 1-th asking
price does not change. So S(M) does not change. In the original case, only N
channels sell, so we know S(M) > R(M). So budget balance is not satisfied
and this case cannot happen.
(ii) i is not in the top M sellers when it asks truthfully. So Ui(vi,M) =
0. i’s utility cannot increase in this case because Ui(vi,M) ≥ Ui(x,M).
Theorem 13. Bid-independent merge is truthful when N is fixed.
Proof. It is easy to see that the design is monotonic, i.e., if a winner wins at
v, it still wins if it bids b > v, as bidding higher does not reduce the group
bid and all other decisions are bid-independent. Next we verify that the price
we charge is the critical value. Specifically we charge a winner the first losing
group bid in its subgraph divided by k, if k members of its group bid higher
than that. We find the maximum k, so no more members can be admitted
and still afford the fair share. To prove it is the critical value, we should show
(1) a buyer still wins if it bids higher, and (2) a buyer loses if it bids lower.
(1) holds because the buyer’s group bid (which is greater than k times of the
critical value) is still higher than the first losing group and the merge process is
bid-independent. To see (2), we consider three cases: (i) k remains the same,
(ii) k increases, and (iii) k decreases. For (i), if a buyer bids lower than that
value, it cannot afford its fair share for the same k even if its group still wins.
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(ii) cannot happen because other members’ bids do not change and no new
members can afford the fair share. In (iii), the fair share is even larger as k
decreases, so the buyer does not win either. Thus a buyer never wins if it bids
lower than the price we charge. Therefore the buyer side with bid-independent
merge is truthful when N is fixed according to Theorem 9.
Theorem 14. Bid-independent merge based allocation does not allow a buyer
to unilaterally change N and gain.
Proof. The proof has same structure as the proof to Theorem 11 but from a
buyer side.
Theorem 15. In our extension to incorporate seller locality, the price we pay
to a seller according to our non-uniform seller side pricing is the critical value
of that seller.
Proof. Suppose seller i becomes budget balanced after dropping T sellers. To
prove i is charged with its critical value, we show (1) i wins if it asks lower,
and (2) i loses if it asks higher.
To prove (1): since i is not dropped in the original case and it now
asks lower, it cannot be dropped before T sellers are dropped. So we consider
two cases: (i) If i becomes budget balanced before T sellers are dropped, it
wins. (ii) If i does not become budget balanced before T sellers are dropped,
the same T − 1 sellers are dropped as in the original case. That is because
the order of their asking prices does not change, regions without i does not
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change, and i’s regions are still not budget balanced as in the original case.
Thus the same T -th seller will be dropped, and i becomes budget balanced in
the same region. So i wins.
To prove (2): similarly we consider (i) If i is dropped before T sellers are
dropped, i does not win. (ii) If i is not dropped before T sellers are dropped,
the same T − 1 sellers are dropped as in the original case because all regions
that have i are still not budget balanced and other regions are not affected
by i’s asking price. Now the scheme selects the highest asking seller that is
not budget balanced to drop. In the original case, the T -th dropped seller,
denoted as w, was selected. Now i asks higher than w, so i will be dropped
instead and lose.
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